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I. INTRODUCTION: HEALTHCARE’S BLURRED LINES
What happens when a drugstore buys a health insurance company?  A
deal of this kind seemed unthinkable until retail pharmacy giant CVS
stepped forward with a $69 billion offer to buy Aetna, one of the major
players in the US health insurance market.1  The merger was announced
in late 2017 and is expected to close in late 2018, subject to approval by
shareholders of both companies and regulators.2  This deal, which further
blurs the lines between “traditionally separate spheres” of the healthcare
industry,3 represents the increasingly popular effort to change the care
delivery mechanisms and to make healthcare more available.  In addition 
to its drugstores, CVS operates CVS MinuteClinic walk-in clinics and CVS
1. Michael J. de la Merced & Reed Abelson, CVS to Buy Aetna for $69 Billion in
a Deal that May Reshape the Health Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.
Approach Under Trump, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2017, 9:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-12-04/cvs-aetna-takeover-may-hinge-on-antitrust-approach-under- 
nytimes.com/2017/12/03/business/dealbook/cvs-is-said-to-agree-to-buy-aetna-reshaping-
health-care-industry.html; Robert Langreth et al., CVS-Aetna Deal May Hinge on Antitrust 
trump.
2.  See Merced & Abelson, supra note 1.  It is still not clear whether the deal will 
be approved by the antitrust agencies, but the proposed transaction is unprecedented in size and
market segments represented. See Langreth et al., supra note 1. 
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Caremark, a pharmacy benefit manager.4  One can certainly envision 
customers—insured through Aetna—walking into a CVS MinuteClinic to 
take care of such needs as: a quick flu shot; a check-up determining a need 
for an antibiotics prescription that can be filled right on site; discounted 
prescription drugs through CVS Caremark; or a convenient visit to a walk-
in clinic at a local drugstore that allows avoiding a costly trip to the
emergency room. 
Although healthcare is one of the most traditional industries, it is currently
undergoing a transformation that is leading to the development and testing 
of new strategies, new products, and maybe even new markets that have not 
been previously considered.5 Insurance companies attempt to consolidate— 
although unsuccessfully at this point.6  Patient-centric services are blossoming.7 
Hospitals start their own insurance plans.8 As discussed above, retail 
pharmacies propose to acquire insurance businesses.9  Employers create
their own accountable care organizations (ACOs).10  Moreover, the “blue
chips of Silicon Valley” have made public their intention to bring the tech
market efficiencies into the traditionally inefficient healthcare market.11
 4. Jacob Passy, What the CVS-Aetna Deal Means for You, MARKETWATCH (Dec.
4, 2017, 5:50 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-the-cvs-aetna-deal-could-
actually-benefit-consumers-2017-10-27. 
5. Fiona Scott Morton, Yale economist and former head economist for the U.S. 
Department of Justice, views “a new sort of industry . . . or a new kind of problem” as a
“fun and interesting and novel” aspect of antitrust mostly due to the fact that “nobody has 
quite figured out what’s legal and what’s not legal.” Fiona M. Scott Morton, Is Antitrust
Law Keeping Up?, YALE INSIGHTS (July 12, 2013), https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/ 
is-antitrust-law-keeping-up [https://perma.cc/97F4-T5RL].  Although she is not applying 
this fully and particularly to healthcare, her approach can certainly be extended to it.  There 
is too much going on in healthcare to have a clear prescription of the legality in antitrust 
sense. 
6. Consolidation attempts between the insurance giants have been unsuccessful in 
the past few years.  Just recently, Aetna’s merger with Humana and Anthem’s merger with
Cigna were banned, as these proposed transactions would highly concentrate the insurance 
market in the United States and limit it to just three major players.  See generally United
States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017); United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. 
Supp. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
7. See infra text accompanying note 114. 
8. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
9. See supra text accompanying note 1.
10. See infra text accompanying note 107. 
11. Dylan Scott, Why Apple, Amazon, and Google are Making Big Health Care 























   
  





   
 





       
Amazon is rumored to be preparing to enter the pharmacy business and 
provide a technological platform for administering healthcare in a partnership 
with JPMorgan Chase and Berkshire Hathaway.12  Apple is designing a
line of medical clinics.13  Google is eyeing the Medicaid market administration 
of services through its sister company Verily.14  Uber is planning to allow
healthcare providers to book rides for their patients and be reimbursed for 
it through insurance.15  Overall, the border between healthcare service provider, 
insurer, and beneficiary is becoming vaguer than ever before, and competition
appears where it was previously unimaginable. 
Healthcare in the United States is designed as a business16 and operates 
in an environment where contracts are as important as taking care of a
patient and increasing costs are as much a concern as favorable treatment
outcomes.  Similar to any business, this environment fosters competition, 
which accordingly serves as one of its crucial drivers. 
Antitrust laws regulating all industries equally apply to healthcare.  Despite
its traditionally inherent social nature, the regulators primarily view healthcare
organizations as businesses that “provide medical services.”17  Judge Bork
suggested antitrust laws serve as a “consumer welfare prescription,”18 no 
pun intended.  This prescription, however, does not differentiate between
industries. There is no separate prescription for how to achieve consumer 
12. Id.; see also Nick Wingfield & Katie Thomas, Hearing Amazon’s Footsteps, the 
Health Care Industry Shudders, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/27/technology/amazon-pharmacy-drugs.html?dlbk. 
13. Scott, supra note 11. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. National health spending in 2016 constituted $10,348 per person, or $3.3 trillion
overall, and accounted for 17.9% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Ctrs. for Medicare 
& Medicaid Servs., NHE Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV (Feb. 14, 2018, 3:16 PM) [hereinafter NHE
Fact Sheet], https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-
and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html [https://perma.cc/FQ8J-
KC9R].  Health spending is projected to exceed GDP growth by 1% per year and therefore 
will constitute 19.7% of GDP by 2026. Id.  To put facts in perspective, defense spending
constituted around 3.2% of GDP in 2016.  U.S. Cong. Budget Office, Defense Outlays and
Forecast in the United States from 2000 to 2028 (as a Percentage of the GDP), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/217581/outlays-for-defense-and-forecast-in-the-us-as-
a-percentage-of-the-gdp/ [https://perma.cc/DX9H-3B8V].
17. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law, 
22 HEALTH AFF. 88, 88 (2003), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.22. 
6.88 (suggesting antitrust regulations focus on the behavior of hospitals and not on their
objective because hospitals are “simply business firms organized to provide medical services”);
see also William M. Sage et al., Why Competition Law Matters to Healthcare Quality, 22
HEALTH AFF. 31, 34 (2003), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.22.2.31
(describing healthcare as a “big business” with price competition as an integral element, similar 
to any other business). 
18. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 
(1993). 
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welfare in the application of antitrust laws as applied to healthcare specifically.19 
Still, antitrust laws, in addition to privacy laws and medical malpractice,
are one of the vehicles that have molded the business of medicine by 
influencing the conduct of multiple parties engaged in providing care and
by dictating how delivery of care can be structured.20 
The business of healthcare is currently undergoing yet another
transformation caused primarily by the Affordable Care Act (ACA)21—a
transformation that antitrust watchdogs have failed to perceive.22  The ACA 
came into effect in 201023 and by 2018 has essentially been embraced by 
the entire healthcare industry.24  It aims to overturn the reimbursement-
19. Enforcement of antitrust principles in healthcare technically started in 1975 
when the Supreme Court decided “learned profession[s]” do not enjoy antitrust exemption. 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). Pre-Goldfarb federal authorities
disregarded the healthcare sector—be it because of the exemption interpretation or because
of lack of expertise, the medical field is a complex industry and quite often is considered 
untouchable due to its complexity.  Post-Goldfarb antitrust enforcement expansion to
healthcare, however, did not adjust its standard principles to the unique nature of healthcare.
Competition in the medical field is viewed the same way as competition in selling pens or 
manufacturing cars.  The paradox is that Goldfarb has no mention of healthcare or medicine. 
See generally id. It is a case examining price fixing by lawyers and the related violation
of the Sherman Act.  See generally id.  Extension of the “learned profession” to medicine 
is what made Goldfarb the seminal case for healthcare antitrust law.  Id. at 787. Another 
paradox is that Goldfarb specifically notes special accommodations may be necessary. Id.
at 792–93. Where does this sweet spot between competition and collaboration in “learned 
professions” belong? Id. at 787. 
20. “Between 1985 and 1999 hospitals were defendants in 61[%] of . . . medical 
antitrust disputes.”  Hammer & Sage, supra note 17 (citing Peter J. Hammer & William M.
Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 565 (2002)).
However, this number is probably significantly less than the number of claims that were
actually filed. See id. Most claims against hospitals result in a settlement, in which case
no published judicial opinion or official record is available. Id.
 21. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18122 (2018)). 
22. However, it is undisputed by the officials that the ACA “only increases th[e] 
importance” of antitrust enforcement on the healthcare industry through “the prospect of 
expanded consumer choice.” Antitrust Laws and Their Effects on Healthcare Providers, Insurers 
and Patients: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 46 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sharis
A. Pozen, Chief of Staff and Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice).
23. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. at 119. 
24. See Shefali Luthra, Doctors Used to Be the Greatest Opponents of Universal Health 
Care. Now They’re Embracing It, MONEY(Aug. 8, 2018), http://time.com/money/5360985/doctors-
single-payer-healthcare/.  Repeal or replacement of the ACA is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, which treats the ACA as continuing indefinitely. In the unlikely event the ACA 
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oriented mentality of healthcare providers.25  Specifically, it calls for changes
in the classical approach of “Fee-For-Service” (FFS) which most consumers 
have faced when seeking medical care.26  Under the ACA, it is no longer
sufficient to treat only the issue causing the visit; instead, the emphasis is 
on treating the patient holistically.27  The holistic approach to medicine28 
requires reassessment of how care is provided and, consequentially, invokes 
the need for a new approach to regulations. The discussion of such an approach
and how it should be treated concentrates around competition and respective 
anticompetitive practices because the change process29 is twofold: (1)
healthcare businesses must find new ways to cooperate, collaborate, and yet 
still remain profitable, and (2) antitrust regulators must ensure the integrity of
such practices.30 
Both federal and state laws regulate the healthcare industry.31  This
Comment primarily focuses on the enforcement of federal antitrust laws,
particularly their interaction with the healthcare industry in the post-ACA 
enactment era.  Integration in healthcare has blossomed since the ACA
became law. Accountable Care Organization (ACO) structure has gained 
is repealed, it would have no measurable impact on the development of the competition 
phenomena described in this Comment; the mechanism of change has been launched and
cannot be easily stopped even by the repeal of a significant legislative vehicle. 
25. The ACA drastically reduced volume-based “Fee-For-Service (FFS) payments,”
deeming them ineffective, and replaced them with “Value Based Purchasing” (VBP)—commonly
referred to as pay-for-performance—payments.  Brandon Bowling et al., Provider Reimbursement 
Following the Affordable Care Act, in BUSINESS AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
168, 169, 173 (Avinandan Mukherjee ed., 2017). One of the key differences between the 
two methods is VBP focuses on quality of care rather than the volume of services provided 
and charged for. Id.
 26. See id.
 27. See Kenneth L. Davis, Hospital Mergers Can Lower Costs and Improve Medical 
Care, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kenneth-l-
davis-hospital-mergers-can-lower-costs-and-improve-medical-care-1410823048. 
28. See, e.g., Alan Spiro & Adam Perlman, A Holistic Approach to Healthcare Can
Lower Costs and Improve Quality, H&HN (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.hhnmag.com/ 
articles/7508-the-case-for-a-holistic-approach-to-health-care [https://perma.cc/R9H5-RDVF]
(explaining the holistic approach to medicine places the patient in the center of care and 
embraces prevention and well-being as healthcare goals equally important to treating illness).
29. Namely, moving from today’s practically nonexistent regulations—as this Comment 
will discuss infra Part III—to something else entirely.
30. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION 43 (2004) [hereinafter IMPROVING HEALTH CARE] (“[H]ealth care 
is not a natural monopoly, and . . . competition has an important role to play in ensuring
that consumers can obtain the care they desire at a price they are willing to pay.”).
31. See Kellyn Norris, Governments Work to Improve Health Care Regulation, U.S.
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2016, 11:57 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthcare-of-tomorrow/
articles/2016-11-04/federal-state-governments-work-to-address-health-care-regulation. 
622
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popularity among providers,32 vertical integration has increased tremendously,33 
and “population health”34 has become the new financial model.  Medicare 
has introduced innovative models to reduce reimbursement, and healthcare 
providers are under pressure to cut costs.  Collaboration and integration 
have become elements of cost containment—from caring for the patient 
to creating new ways to engage consumers with the focus to better understand 
consumer behavior35 and correspondingly motivating patients to use the
provider.  Antitrust regulations in healthcare have failed to adequately capture 
and address the rapid development of the healthcare industry over the past
ten years.  This Comment asserts that the majority of strategic development 
and structural innovation in the past decade has been undertaken to control 
the patient and ultimately capture market share. 
Part II of this Comment summarizes the current state of antitrust regulations
in the healthcare field by briefly describing the major applicable antitrust 
laws and the enforcing federal agencies.  The assumption is that antitrust
regulations are intended to provide for equal participation and to prevent 
unfair advantages to certain players for reasons outside of regular competition. 
Part III examines emerging trends in the healthcare continuum and the
challenge they pose to standard antitrust principles.  Specifically, it explores 
provider integration, innovation, and experimentation in the healthcare 
organization structure that enable risk- and cost-sharing and expand control
over the patient.  Part III also outlines why current regulations do not ensure
 32. See, e.g., Jacqueline LaPointe, Accountable Care Organizations Continue to 
Grow with 11% Boost, REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (June 29, 2017), https://revcycleintelligence. 
com/news/accountable-care-organizations-continue-to-grow-with-11-boost [https://perma.cc/
PP95-7K95].
33. See, e.g., Laura Dyrda, Healthcare Transactions in the Era of Megamergers 




34. Originally coming from Canada, “population health” management entered the 
United States of America in late 1990s to early 2000s but became widespread with the 
enactment of the ACA.  David Kindig & Greg Stoddart, What is Population Health?, 93 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 380, 380 (2003). The term is defined as “the health outcomes of a 
group of individuals, including the distribution of such outcomes within the group.” Id.
35. KPMG Strategy, for example, differentiates this technique from the traditional
function of patient experience departments, which focuses on providing the service to
existing patients.  Lara Ramos Hegwer, New Structures, New Roles for the Future of 



























         




the equality of players in the field.  The premise is that the current regulatory 
framework is set up to allow larger health systems to engage in collaborations 
through means directly and indirectly provided by the ACA without being
scrutinized by the antitrust enforcement agencies and to disadvantage 
smaller organizations—standalone hospitals or individual physician practices 
—that are seeking entry to novel practices, such as accountable care 
organizations, self-funded insurance mechanisms, and engagement in
population health strategies. 
Part IV lays out the proposed solution to the alleged competitive
inequality by explaining which areas of the existing healthcare antitrust
regulations should be adjusted to address the recent trends in healthcare,
such as ACOs, vertical integration between healthcare organizations, provider-
owned health plans—all developments where a healthcare provider takes
on full control over the patient and eliminates intermediaries such as 
classic insurance companies. 
Part V provides an assessment of how the changes or absence thereof 
will impact the competition and the subsequent development of healthcare 
in the United States.
II. ANTITRUST LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Scope of federal antitrust law is broad and has a long history that explains
the current regulatory construction.  This section provides a brief overview of
legislative provisions governing healthcare antitrust enforcement, explains 
how such enforcement actually occurs, describes what healthcare antitrust
is, and, more importantly, what it is not.
A. Federal Antitrust Law in Healthcare 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act)36 is the key federal
antitrust provision passed by Congress as a “comprehensive charter of 
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as 
the rule of trade.”37 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, 
combinations, and conspiracies “in restraint of trade or commerce,”38 whereas 
§ 2 makes it illegal “to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons.”39  The Sherman Act carries
36. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)). 
37. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ 
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/TU64-DN3L].
38.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
39. Id. § 2.
624
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both civil and criminal penalties.40  Criminal prosecution under the Sherman 
Act may be brought by only one federal agency: the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ).41  In 2016, the DOJ tried fifty-one criminal
cases, compared to its peak in 2011 with ninety cases, and recovered $399
million in criminal fines and penalties.42 
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (FTCA) has the power to
prohibit “[u]nfair methods of competition in . . . commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”43  In 1948, the United States Supreme Court
held that all violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTCA.44  However, 
distinct from the Sherman Act, the FTCA provides only civil remedies.45 
The FTCA created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce the
Act with authority over a range of activities.46  The FTCA does not technically 
apply to not-for-profits, a point of significant importance in the healthcare 
context.47  Not-for-profit hospitals were originally exempt from the FTCA,
 40. Id. § 1 (imposing criminal penalties of up to $100 million for a corporation and 
$1 million for an individual, along with up to ten years in prison).
41. See id. § 4; ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR 
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 1 (2005) (“Price fixing, bid rigging, and market 
allocation are economic crimes [that] rob purchasers, contribute to inflation, destroy public 
confidence in the economy, and undermine our system of free enterprise.”). 
42. Criminal Enforcement: Trends Charts Through Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts 
[https://perma.cc/BU7G-P27Q]; see also The Antitrust Laws, supra note 37. 
43.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
44. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 37 (alluding to FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 
683, 694 (1948) (“[C]onduct violative of the Sherman Act may likewise come within the 
unfair trade practice prohibitions of the Trade Commission Act . . . .”).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (penalizing those who violate the FTCA with” a civil penalty
of not more than $10,000 for each violation”). 
46. Id. § 45(a)(2) (enabling the FTC to prevent “unfair methods of competition . . . 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” by individuals, partnerships, and corporations). 
“[T]he FTC is dedicated to advancing consumer interests while encouraging innovation 
and competition in our dynamic economy.”  What We Do, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/DA7K-S893].  This broad language 
means the FTC is in charge of policy development, conducting investigations, and
pursuing legal action when antitrust violations are discovered. It also means the FTC is at
least partially in charge of interpreting what an antitrust violation is.  See id. Because all 
violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTCA, the FTC is empowered to pursue 
violations of the Sherman Act as well, even if indirectly through the FTCA.
47. Authority of the FTC to enforce the FTCA extends only to corporations that are 
carrying on business for their own or their members’ profit.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); see 
also Eric S. Berman & Shahin O. Rothermel, Court Upholds FTC Jurisdiction over
Common Carrier: Nonprofits Should Take Heed, VENABLE LLP (May 11, 2015), https:// 
www.venable.com/court-upholds-ftc-jurisdiction-over-common-carrier-nonprofits-
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but the courts have since extended its application to non-profit corporations
that are operated for their own profit or that of their members.48  Thus, the
FTCA is now relevant to the non-profit arena of healthcare.49 
Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (Clayton Act) to 
clarify the kinds of practices prohibited by the Sherman Act.50  The language
of the latter is broad and has been open to court interpretation,51 which 
have consistently prevented “unreasonable restraint of trade.”52  The Clayton 
Act prevents “trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and 
before consummation.”53  Unlike the Sherman Act, which it is intended to 
should-take-heed-05-11-2015/ (“The FTC . . . usually refrains from pursuing enforcement 
actions against corporations that have been recognized as exempt from federal income tax 
under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, because these entities carry on
business in pursuit of their tax-exempt purposes rather than for their own profit or that of 
their members. . . . The FTC has taken action against nonprofits in certain cases and will 
doubtless continue to do so when it believes an investigation or enforcement action is 
warranted.”).  According to the American Hospital Association (AHA), more than 80% of 
hospitals in the U.S. are government run or not-for-profit. See Fast Facts on US Hospitals, 
2018, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (Feb. 2018), https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals
(in 2018, out of 5,534 registered hospitals, only 1,035 were investor owned for-profit
community hospitals). This said, if non-profits were exempt from the FTCA, a majority
of US hospitals would automatically enjoy such exemption.
48. See FTC v. Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 487–88 (7th Cir.
1975) (holding that the FTCA does apply to for-profit organizations and physicians in
private practice); Cmty. Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding 
that when corporations organized under nonprofit laws engage in profit-making or other
activities, they may lose their charter through quo warranto proceedings).
49. As discussed previously, the opposite treatment would automatically allow most
U.S. healthcare establishments to avoid antitrust regulations.  See supra note 47. There is 
disagreement between legal experts regarding the adequacy of this approach, which is 
represented primarily by Richard Posner and William Lynk. Compare Tomas J. Philipson 
& Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector, 52 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (2009)
(supporting the treatment of non-profit establishments similarly to for-profits), with
William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L.
& ECON. 437, 459 (1995) (suggesting exclusion of non-profits from traditional antitrust 
rules mostly due to their inability to fix higher prices).  However, Lynk’s view is considered
outdated based on the government agencies’ treatment of the issue, which stipulates that
non-profit hospitals with more market power set higher prices with all other factors being
equal. JOHN SIMPSON & RICHARD SHIN, DO NONPROFIT HOSPITALS EXERCISE MARKET
POWER? 16 (1996). 
50. See Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018)).
51. The Sherman Act explicitly prohibits “contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”  15 U.S.C. at § 1.
52. The “unreasonable” requisite as applied to such restraint was adopted in the 
Standard Oil case in 1911, over two decades after the passage of the Sherman Act.  Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87–88 (1911) (emphasis omitted). 
53. Robin E. Remis, Healthcare and the Federal Antitrust Laws: The Likelihood of
a Harmonious Coexistence, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 117 (1997) (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 63-698, at 1 (1914)). 
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expand on, however, the Clayton Act carries no criminal penalties.54  Section 
7 of the Clayton Act is arguably its most important provision; it prohibits
mergers that would “lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”55 
The Clayton Act was amended by the Robinson–Patman Antidiscrimination 
Act of 1936 (Robinson-Patman Act)56 and by the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act 
of 1976 (Hart–Scott–Rodino Act).57 The Robinson–Patman Act “bans
certain discriminatory prices, services, and allowances in dealings between 
merchants.”58 The Hart–Scott–Rodino Act, also known as the Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976, requires parties to notify federal antitrust
agencies about intended consolidations exceeding the specified dollar 
threshold.59  This requirement strengthened the incipiency provision of the 
Clayton Act by allowing the agencies to investigate proposed transactions 
54. A Clayton Act violation carries only a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per violation.
15 U.S.C. § 21(l).
55. Id. § 18.  Under the Clayton Act, antitrust considerations are “not merely an
appraisal of immediate impact of the merger upon competition, but prediction of its impact 
upon competitive conditions in the future.”  United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 
321, 362 (1963).  It is essentially a reasonability check on whether competition will be 
lessened and, therefore, it must be predictable enough to serve for “sound business planning.” 
Id.  Consequentially, § 7 of the Clayton Act protects healthy competition from the possibility
that some companies would entertain a merger only to increase their market power. Id.
56. Robinson–Patman Antidiscrimination Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 
1526 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2019)). 
57. The Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2018)). 
58. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 37. 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).  When the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act passed in 1976, the minimum 
dollar threshold—size of transaction—for preliminary reporting was $50 million; it is 
adjusted annually and was $80.8 million in 2017.  Premerger Notification Office Staff,
Bureau of Competition, HSR Threshold Adjustments and Reportability for 2017, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (Feb. 7, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/ 
competition-matters/2017/02/hsr-threshold-adjustments-reportability-2017 [https://perma.cc/
NR9W-2QGS] (addressing “as adjusted” threshold amounts and confirming the annual 
adjustment).  The value of transactions in healthcare is oftentimes more modest.  In the
second quarter of 2017, for example, total deal value was $49.6 billion—219 deals total—
but $43.3 billion of it was attributed to only ten mega-deals exceeding $1 billion each. 
NICK DONKAR, PWC DEALS: US HEALTH SERVICES DEALS INSIGHTS Q2 2017, at 1–2 
(2017), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/publications/assets/pwc-health-services-
deals-insights-q2-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J7P-4584].  Simple math shows that the average 
value of the remaining 209 deals is only $30 million, which is below the reportability
threshold. See id. 
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pre-consummation.60  However, exceptions do apply, and many healthcare 
transactions do not meet the threshold by default.61 
The McCarran–Fergusson Act of 1945 (McCarran–Fergusson Act) created 
another exception that explicitly exempted the “business of insurance”
from some federal antitrust laws.62  Specifically, that meant the states were 
empowered to regulate insurance companies as they deem fit provided (1) 
the insurance companies act in their capacity of the “business of insurance,” 
(2) the business falls under the regulation by state law, and (3) the challenged 
activity does not constitute “boycott, coercion, or intimidation.”63  The
McCarran–Fergusson Act does not define the “business of insurance,”
which has left the courts to interpret it to (1) “involve[] the underwriting 
or spreading of risk,” (2) encompass “insurer-insured relationship,” and
(3) be limited to activities of the “entities within the insurance industry.”64 
The McCarran–Fergusson Act apparently does not prevent federal agencies 
from challenging health insurance mergers as demonstrated by the scrutiny 
applied to the Anthem/Cigna and Aetna/Humana proposed mergers in 2016.65 
The Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2017 is pending legislature 
aimed at repealing the “business of insurance” federal exemption.66  The
scope of this Comment excludes analysis of the proposed legislation and
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a). 
61. See DONKAR, supra note 59, at 2 (discussing transaction size).  Additionally, 
“acquisitions . . . in the ordinary course of business are exempt.”  16 C.F.R. § 802.1 (2012).
62. McCarran–Fergusson Act of 1945, ch. 20, § 1, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2018)). 
63.  15 U.S.C. at §§ 1011–13. 
64. Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: the McCarran–Ferguson Act
and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 90 (1983) (citing Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) and Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 
119 (1982)).
65. These two cases were widely discussed in the healthcare field.  The size of the
merger was unprecedented and the timing of the two transactions came very close to each
other.  In September 2015, the DOJ started proceedings challenging the horizontal merger 
between Anthem and Cigna, which was enjoined in April 2017. See United States v. 
Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  In July 2016, the DOJ opened the case
challenging the horizontal merger of Aetna and Humana, which was resolved in January
2017 by prohibiting the merger to proceed. See United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
66. Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2017, H.R. 372, 115th Cong. 
(2017).  The Act—which was passed in early 2017 by the House of Representatives and
is currently under review of the Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary—is meant to repeal
the McCarran–Ferguson antitrust exemptions for health insurance companies but keeps it
intact for other insurance companies, such as auto and property. See H.R.372–Competitive 
Health Insurance Reform Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
115th-congress/house-bill/372 [https://perma.cc/6HWQ-ZXQH].  The justification for the 
repeal is the national nature of health insurance companies. See H.R. 372: Competitive 
Health Insurance Reform Act of 2017, GOVTRACK (May 25, 2017), https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/115/hr372/summary [https://perma.cc/JES5-P58Z].
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its impact; however, the initial success of the repeal efforts presumably
evidences the changing view to insurance companies.  Pending removal
of the state exemption indicates insurers are perceived as operating on the 
national scale with the presumption that state antitrust laws no longer
adequately protect against antitrust violations.67  One of the main arguments 
used by proponents of the repeal is the highly-concentrated nature of the
healthcare market and barriers to entry that require “a high standard of 
uniform [federal] protection” instead of being regulated solely on the state 
level.68 
Federal antitrust laws, in summary, prohibit restraint of trade and have 
protection of competition and of consumer welfare as their ultimate purpose.69 
The major federal antitrust provisions, overall, are “broad and ambiguous 
in language [and, in essence, are] the skeleton to which the courts have added 
the meat.”70  Federal antitrust laws can be relatively easily applied to horizontal 
transactions, as supported by the long history of judicial interpretation. 
Yale economist, Fiona Scott Morton, said: “When a competition problem 
67. There were unsuccessful efforts to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust 
exemption in the past. See Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1994, H.R. 9, 103d Cong.; 
see also Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 494, 114th Cong.
(amending the McCarran–Ferguson Act to declare that nothing in that Act modifies,
impairs, or supersedes the operation of antitrust laws with respect to the business of health
insurance, including dental insurance); Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement 
Act of 2015, H.R. 99, 114th Cong. (prohibiting the McCarran–Ferguson Act from being 
construed to permit health insurance or medical malpractice insurance issuers to engage in price
fixing, bid rigging, or market allocations in connection with providing health insurance or 
medical malpractice coverage).
68. Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2017: Hearing on H.R. 372 Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (prepared statement of David Balto, Principal, David 
A. Balto Law Offices). The repeal, therefore, serves the purpose of uniform federal regulation
in insurance regulations, considering the fact that many insurance companies operate across 
state lines. See Richard Cauchi, Allowing Purchases of Out-of-State Health Insurance, 
NCSL (June 1, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/out-of-state-health-insurance-
purchases.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZN7T-HZLJ].  Proponents of having “business of insurance” 
exception intact argue that only the ultimate repeal of the McCarran–Fergusson Act would 
allow complete federal regulation. See, e.g., Morgan Lee, The Implied Antitrust Immunity 
Analysis of Credit Suisse v. Billing: A Framework Congress Should Apply to McCarran– 
Ferguson Act Repeal Efforts, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 349, 388 (2015). 
69. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, at ix (1976)
(“[T]he only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare . . . .”); see
also BORK, supra note 18. 
70. JOHN J. MILES, ANTITRUST FUNDAMENTALS 6 (1999), Westlaw AHLA-PAPERS 
P10049905. 
 629









   
  
  
   
      
 
 
     
  
     
  
 
   
   
 
     
 
     
  
 
    
  
    
 
     




arises, it has to fit into the laws we have: the Sherman Act and the Clayton 
Act . . . . [a]nd how you interpret those into the modern economy takes a 
little bit of skill.”71  Courts are not the only interpreters of antitrust laws; 
the first stab at the interpretation is usually taken by those who are put in
the position to enforce these laws.72 
B. The Enforcers of the Antitrust Laws and Regulatory Framework 
Two separate government agencies, the FTC73 and the Antitrust Division 
of the DOJ,74 enforce federal antitrust laws.75 Their authority in some instances 
is shared and in other instances is exclusive to a single agency.76  For
 71. Morton, supra note 5.
72. The McCarran–Fergusson Act partially explains why every state has its own 
antitrust laws by stating the antitrust laws “shall be applicable to the business of insurance
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.”  15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2018). 
Pennsylvania is the only state without state antitrust legislature.  1 JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH
CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1.3 (2018). State laws may not significantly differ from federal
antitrust laws; in California, for example, the Cartwright Act, which passed in 1907—earlier
than some of the federal antitrust statutes—prohibits restraints on trade and commerce. 
LAURIE L. LEVENSON & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, THE RUTTER GROUP–CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL 
Law § 9:36 (2017–2018 ed. 2017).  California antitrust laws are enforced by the California
Attorney General and the district attorneys.  CARLTON A. VARNER & THOMAS D. NEVINS, 
CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 2 (3d ed. 2003).  The violation
may result in criminal penalties—fines of up to $1 million for corporations and $250,000 
for individuals along with a possibility of imprisonment of up to three years—or civil
penalties—$2,500 per violation. Id.
73. The FTC has five Commissioners, appointed by the President for the term of
seven years.  15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018).  The FTC is comprised of three Bureaus: the Bureau of 
Competition, which “seeks to prevent anticompetitive mergers and other anticompetitive
business practices in the marketplace”; the Bureau of Consumer Protection, which “protect[s]
consumers against unfair, deceptive or fraudulent practices”; and the Bureau of Economics,
which “helps the FTC evaluate the economic impact of its actions.” Bureaus & Offices, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices [https://perma.cc/UEN6-
MKQK].
74. The DOJ is a division of the Office of the U.S. Attorney General, which is led
by the Assistant Attorney General and is comprised of Civil, Criminal, and Economic Sections. 
Sections and Offices, U.S. DEPT. JUST. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/sections- 
and-offices [https://perma.cc/D4JJ-8GPK].
75. Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement [https://
perma.cc/UH2C-PCY6]; Mission, U.S. DEPT. JUST. (July 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/mission [https://perma.cc/4GVC-7D88]. Together, the agencies are protecting the three
pillars of antitrust: consumer choice, innovation, and free competition.  See id.  For a more
detailed discussion of the differences between the two agencies, see Todd N. Hutchison, 
Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and the FTC, ABA, https://www.american 
bar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/understanding_ 
differences.html [https://perma.cc/9YN3-8Y4A]. 
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (2018) (establishing the FTC enforcement provisions); id. §
25 (providing the DOJ proceedings provision). 
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example, both agencies enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act.77  On the other
hand, the DOJ enforces the Sherman Act,78 while the FTC enforces the
FTCA.79 Historically, the “agencies complement each other [and develop]
expertise in particular industries or markets.”80  Following the divide and
conquer approach, the FTC has become the leading agency on matters
involving providers, and the DOJ has acted as the leading agency on matters 
involving insurers.81  Primarily, the two agencies ensure antitrust compliance
of mergers and major developments in healthcare that have the potential
to impact consumers and result in increased “market power,” or the ability 
to raise prices unilaterally.82 
Both agencies provided significant input in the area of healthcare antitrust 
regulation in the years immediately preceding or directly following the 
enactment of the ACA.83  They view their role as “help[ing to] maintain 
competition in the healthcare financing and delivery markets, and ensur[ing]
that market participants can compete to satisfy consumer demand.”84 
Importantly, the input by the agencies in the form of guidelines does not
 77. Id. § 21(a); id. § 25. 
78. Id. § 4.
79. Id. § 45.  Although the FTC does not enforce the Sherman Act directly, it is charged 
with its indirect enforcement through the FTCA. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 37. 
80. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 37. 
81. See DOJ, FTC FOCUS ON BUSY HEALTHCARE DEALS LANDSCAPE (2016), https:// 
www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/health-research-institute/assets/pdf/pwc-hri-spotlight-
doj-ftc-deals-activity.pdf [https://perma.cc/G86K-2X5C].
82. The term “market power” is frequently used to describe the anticompetitive practice 
of price fixing and control market.  Hammer & Sage, supra note 17, at 89.  Some believe
exercising “market power” is the “touchstone” in all antitrust cases. Sage et al., supra note 
17, at 33. 
83. Federal agencies are said to be “integral to advancing the [Obama] Administration’s
healthcare reform goals.” MATTHEW L. CANTOR & MARLENE KOURY, A WATCHFUL ANTITRUST
EYE IN HEALTHCARE 1 (2012) https://s3.amazonaws.com/ccannon/pdf/cantor_koury_healthcare 
_antitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FVY-43MQ]. The FTC and the DOJ promoted the healthcare
cost containment goal of the ACA by blocking mergers that had potential to increase prices
and decrease competition. See id. at 1, 3 (referring to the FTC blocking the merger between 
Palmyra Park Hospital and Phoebe Putney Health Systems, as well as to the DOJ lawsuit 
against Blue Cross Blue Shield).  Some actions by the FTC and the DOJ that indirectly
promoted the purposes of the ACA include the revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
—latest revision in 2010, in the midst of the ACA passing—and the issuance of the ACO 
Policy Statements—latest revision in 2011, immediately after the ACA passing. See discussion
infra Section II.C. 
84. IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 30. 
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constitute binding legal authority, and therefore, is merely persuasive.85 
Still, the agencies provide guidance to healthcare organizations so that antitrust 
violations do not arise; they take a proactive rather than retroactive approach.
The agencies first jointly issued the Statements of Antitrust Enforcement 
Policy in Healthcare (Statements) in 1993, amended them in 1994, and further 
revised in 1996; they have remained unchanged since.86  The Statements 
explain the agencies’ rationale in antitrust analysis and contain examples 
of its application, along with outlining “antitrust safety zones.”87  The “safety 
zones” mean that unless there are obvious violations, the FTC and the DOJ 
will not challenge the transaction.88 
Two other important documents, produced in collaborative effort by the 
FTC and the DOJ, are the Horizontal Merger Guidelines89 and the Non-
Horizontal Merger Guidelines,90 which are often referred to as Vertical Merger
Guidelines.91  Because they are not industry-specific, both documents provide
standard frameworks that are applied generally. 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines were first issued in 1968 and have 
undergone periodic revisions, the latest occurring in 2010.92 Their purpose 
85. The guidelines are the agencies’ interpretation of the antitrust law. Courts often
rely on them without being required to follow them. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–
Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 784 n.9 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Although
the Merger Guidelines are ‘not binding on the courts’ . . . they ‘are often used as persuasive
authority.’” (citations omitted)); United States v. Kinder, 64 F.3d 757, 771 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“Although it is widely acknowledged that the Merger Guidelines do not bind the judiciary
in determining whether to sanction a corporate merger or acquisition for anticompetitive
effect . . . courts commonly cite them as a benchmark of legality.” (citation omitted)). 
86. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 1–2 (1996) [hereinafter THE STATEMENTS].  Since 
1996, however, healthcare has changed dramatically: the ACA was introduced in 2010, 
and multiple other initiatives followed. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 18001–18122 (2018)). 
87. Id. at 5–7. 
88. Id.
89. Statutory framework of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines includes § 7 of the 
Clayton Act, §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
90. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, NON-HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) [hereinafter NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
91. See generally, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revisiting the U.S. Vertical
Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016).
92. Revisions took place in 1982, 1984, 1992, 1997, and 2010. 20th Anniversary of the
1982 Merger Guidelines: The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of
Antitrust Doctrine, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 22, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger 
[https://perma.cc/28CY-32BW].  See generally HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 89. 
632
POST KAPCHINSKIY PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2018 1:31 PM       
 








     





      
        
 
   
   
 
  
   
    
  
 
    
  
  
    
   
     
   
     
 
       
     
   
[VOL. 55:  617, 2018] The Duality of Provider and Payer 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
is to describe the “principal analytical techniques [and] practices”93 that
the agencies apply when analyzing horizontal mergers among competitors.94 
Relevant factors used by the agencies would include: relevant products, 
geographic markets, market participants’ identification and assessment, and 
methods to calculate market share and market concentration,95 to name a 
few.96  These guidelines also assess conduct besides mergers, such as entry 
barriers and efficiencies, and therefore, assist in assessing new player formation 
and coordinating care.97 
The Vertical Merger Guidelines were issued in 1984.98 Antitrust experts
assert they are overdue for an update.99 They do not address healthcare 
specifically and are rarely referred to in court decisions.100 
After the enactment of the ACA, there was an increase in successful antitrust
actions initiated by the agencies.101  The enforcers have taken the position 
93. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 89. 
94. Horizontal mergers involve conduct between firms at the same level of production. 
Id.  In healthcare, it is equivalent to two hospitals merging. Id.  In contrast, vertical mergers are
between businesses at different levels of the same industry, such as a hospital acquisition 
of a health plan. Id.
95. A standard measure of market concentration is Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
(HHI), which is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market
and then summing the resulting numbers.  Proportionally greater weight is given to larger 
market shares. Id. at 18–19.  Based on the HHI, markets are classified as unconcentrated, 
moderately concentrated, or highly concentrated.  Id.
96. See DEBORAH L. FEINSTEIN, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH CARE:
PROSCRIPTION, NOT PRESCRIPTION 4 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/409481/140619_aco_speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM6R-ANCN].  These 
factors were relevant enough to be outlined by the director of FTC Bureau of Competition. 
Id.; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 3–6 (naming primary types 
and sources of evidence indicating anticompetitive effects of a merger, with market share 
and market concentration among those). 
97. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 28. 
98. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at 23. 
99. Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical
Merger Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 
91 WASH. L.R. 199, 201 (2016); see also Salop & Culley, supra note 91, at 2 (describing the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines as “woefully out of date” due to the fact that they “do not reflect
current economic thinking” and agency practices). 
100. Overall, there are fewer vertical enforcement actions than horizontal enforcement
actions: professors Salop and Culley have counted forty-eight vertical merger challenges
between 1994 and 2015.  Salop & Culley, supra note 91, at 3. 
101. DAVID A. BALTO & JAMES KOVACS, CONSOLIDATION IN HEALTHCARE MARKETS:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2 (2013).  Agencies acknowledge that they distinguish between
good and bad collaborations and that antitrust enforcement is meant to separate them.  See 
FEINSTEIN, supra note 96, at 2 (“In every investigation of health care provider transactions,
 633
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that the success of healthcare reform “depend[s] heavily on competition to 
control costs and improve quality.”102  However, the increased litigation 
has not yet touched upon the innovative vertical mergers and collaborations
and has primarily challenged horizontal mergers.103  Still, the increase in 
litigated matters evidences the growing concern of market concentration and 
the impact of the ACA-encouraged vertical integration. 
In addition to these federal regulatory entities, state regulators and private 
suits104 also may play a role in regulating antitrust activities in this context.105 
These areas of regulation, however, are outside the scope of this Comment.106 
we carefully consider evidence that the transaction will benefit consumers through improved 
quality, new services and/or decreased costs. We expect and encourage parties to provide 
us with concrete evidence to support their quality claims.  We work closely with experts in the
field to assess the arguments made by providers about improvements to quality of care.”). 
102. Edith Ramirez, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care—Controlling Costs, Improving
Quality, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2245, 2245 (2014). 
103. In the period from 2010 to 2015, only seven vertical mergers were challenged
but none of them were in healthcare.  Jaime Stilson, Partner, Dorsey & Whitney & Roger Feldman, 
Professor, Univ. of Minn., Lecture for the Minnesota State Bar Association: Vertical Mergers 
in Healthcare (Jan. 15, 2016). 
104. Private plaintiffs are typically healthcare providers—that is, competitors, labor unions,
and consumer groups.  See ARTHUR N. LERNER, MERGERS: ANTITRUST ISSUES FOR HOSPITALS
AND HEALTH PLANS 5 (2008), https://www.crowell.com/documents/Mergers_Antitrust-Issues-
for-Hospitals-and-Health-Plans_Lerner.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2KH-FEVN]. It is noted that
most private antitrust challenges are not successful: from 1985 to 1999, plaintiffs prevailed 
in only 14% of the cases, whereas defendants won 67% of cases.  IMPROVING HEALTH CARE,
supra note 30, at 38 (citing Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Healthcare Quality,
and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 565 (2002)). 
105. State attorneys general may also investigate merger activity in the health
insurance industry. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2018).  State insurance departments must also
review and approve proposed insurer and health maintenance organization mergers under
state insurance holding company laws.  See About the NAIC, NAIC, http://www.naic.org/ 
index_about.htm [https://perma.cc/TE7F-332Z]. The role of state antitrust enforcement is 
viewed as complementary to the one of federal enforcement: the mission of federal and
state antitrust law enforcement is “to protect the public from the harms flowing from 
anticompetitive conduct.”  DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM.,
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2 (2015), https://www.
ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-international-competition-fora/ 
publicprivate_united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCF6-RX3F]. 
106. It is worth noting the existence of the doctrine of state action antitrust immunity, 
which is invoked when the questioned conduct arises from the state laws or regulations. 
State Action Antitrust Immunity, WEX, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/state_action_anti
trust_immunity [https://perma.cc/7PHV-J8AT]. Under Parker v. Brown, a Supreme Court
decision from 1943, state-authorized action is shielded from the federal antitrust laws.  Shepard 
Goldfein & James A. Keyte, Supreme Court Takes Case to Clarify State Action Immunity 
Doctrine, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 2014.  To use the state action immunity, however, the state 
must be actively and closely monitoring the process.  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (“[T]he challenged restraint must be ‘one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’ [and] the policy must be
‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.” (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978))). 
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 C. Agencies’ Treatment of Accountable Care Organizations 
The ACA brought into existence a brand-new healthcare structure: ACOs.107 
The growing number of ACOs were the primary driver for providing 
formalized guidance on how to treat the new collaboration structure under 
the federal antitrust laws published by the FTC and DOJ in 2011.108  The
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(ACO Statement) addresses the process of the formal antitrust review of
the ACO and potential antitrust concerns.109 The ACO Statement has not been 
revised or expanded.110  A revision, however, is probably due because the
ACO Statement was drafted in the early era of the ACO development, before 
the healthcare participants found themselves widely engaged in the ACO 
structure.  The ACO Statement addresses the ACO phenomenon at its dawn, 
during the exploration stage. 
The ACO Statement applies to providers eligible for participation in the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program.111  Mergers are specifically excluded 
from coverage by the document and delegate merger evaluations to the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.112  “Fully integrated entities” are also not 
subject to the ACO Statement’s guidance.113
 107. Accountable Care Organizations are “integrated network[s] of doctors and
hospitals that share[] financial and medical responsibility for providing coordinated care 
to patients with the intent of limiting unnecessary spending and improving care.”  LISA 
SIMONSON MAIURO, ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONSUMERS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2015); see also Jenny Gold, 
Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015),
https://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq [https://perma.cc/UJF2-T32U].
108. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared
Savings Program, FED. REG., Oct. 28, 2011, at 67026 [hereinafter ACO Statement].
that now includes over 500 Shared Savings Program ACOs in fifty states and provides care to
 109. Id.
 110. See id.
 111. Id. at 67027. The Medicare Shared Savings Program is the original ACO model 
nine million Medicare beneficiaries. About the Program, CMS.GOV (Mar. 27, 2018, 11:54 
AM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavings 
program/about.html [https://perma.cc/8MAK-X8AG].
112. ACO Statement, supra note 108, at 67027. 
113. Id. Integration is usually viewed as a system consisting of primary care providers,
specialists, and hospitals—that is, a system capable of providing a full spectrum of services. 
Alain C. Enthoven, What is an Integrated Health Care Financing and Delivery System
(IDS)? and What Must Would-be IDS Accomplish to Become Competitive with Them?, 
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Overall, federal antitrust laws establish a basic framework for all businesses,
including the business of healthcare. Regulating agencies created additional 
guidelines to explain their interpretation of law and assist market participants. 
The regulations, however, do not adequately address the development of 
healthcare resulting from the adoption of the ACA.  The existing framework is
not expansive enough to address the issues specific to healthcare especially 
in the evolutionary period.




Existing regulations do not adequately reflect structural changes that 
healthcare has undergone in the past decade.  “Coordinated care” has been
the key trend of the decade but the term is not defined in the regulations. 
Intuitively, coordination in healthcare cannot avoid impacts to the industry
because the balance between “restraint of trade” and “coordinated care”
is shaky.
Current trends clearly demonstrate that, unlike in more traditional industries, 
in healthcare, especially today, there is a tight connection between value 
and compensation for services.114  The ACA creates financial incentives
for consolidation among players in healthcare at the levels that seemed
impossible pre-enactment of the ACA; providers, payers, and employers 
are collaborating to improve quality of care.115  As opposed to traditional
industries, such as manufacturing or merchandise, where profit motive and
lack of oversight drive consolidation strategy, integration in healthcare is
implicitly encouraged—and, in all fairness, practically mandated to remain in
the market—through payment reform initiatives such as bundled payments116 
and development of ACOs. The increase in mergers is tremendous.117 
HEALTH ECON. & OUTCOME RES., May 2016, at 1, 1.  Recently, integration started to include
health plans as well. Id. at 4–6. 
114. The ACA has incentives for reducing costs and increasing quality of care, such
as the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. See The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing 




116. Bundled payment is a single payment for a “bundle” of related services during
an episode of care rather than separate payments for each service. See Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 323 (2010) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18122 (2018)). 
117. See Michael E. Martinez et al., Antitrust Considerations Surrounding Health 
Care Consolidation Among Hospitals and Physicians, K&L GATES (Aug. 19, 2014), http:// 
www.klgates.com/antitrust-considerations-surrounding-health-care-consolidation-among-
hospitals-and-physicians-08-19-2014 [https://perma.cc/AJ53-CH2U] (citing A Wave of Hospital 
Mergers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ 
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Most mergers subject the participating entities to often undesired attention 
from the antitrust regulators and certainly competitors who are assessing 
the impacts. The best way to avoid antitrust scrutiny, per the FTC, is not to 
merge.118  Industry players seem to despise this option; there is obvious growth
of transactional activity, especially across providers of different types.119 
Specifically, integration activity has been on the rise.  Traditional alliances, 
such as joint ventures, medical foundation models, and management agreements
with physicians, are supplemented with transactions that are reflective of
the efforts to create care continuums.120  Some call this trend the new rise
of “managed care.”121 
interactive/2013/08/13/business/A-Wave-of-Hospital-Mergers.html?_r=0 ) (noting that in
2009, before the ACA was enacted, there were fifty hospital acquisition deals and in 2012, 
there were 105); see also MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., MAKING HEALTHCARE MARKETS WORK:
COMPETITION POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE 7 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/04/gaynor-et-al-final-report-v11.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTV3-LJV7] (“There
were 1,412 hospital mergers from 1998 to 2015, with 561 of them from 2010–2015.”). 
118. Martinez et al., supra note 117 (“What is the best way to avoid antitrust scrutiny,
according to the FTC? Do not merge.  Combinations that fall short of merger, such as joint 
ventures, and that provide for bona fide financial or clinical integration reasonably necessary to
achieve consumer cost savings or improved care, may face less antitrust scrutiny.”).
119. Consolidation activity involving hospitals increased 18% from 2014 to 2015. 
Ayla Ellison, The Rise of ‘Super Regional Systems’ and What it Means for Healthcare, 
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Feb 24, 2016), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-
transactions-and-valuation/the-rise-of-super-regional-systems-and-what-it-means-for-
healthcare.html [https://perma.cc/U6TV-65GA].  2016 continued the growth trend in the 
number of healthcare transactions.  See John Meindl & Winston Smart, VMG’s Healthcare 
Transactions and M&A Report: 2016 Trends and 2017 Expectations, in AHLA 2017 HEALTH
CARE TRANSACTIONS RESOURCE GUIDE at 37, 37–38 (2017), https://vmghealth.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/VMG-Health-Transaction-Trends-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 5SCT-
TSEN] (examining 2016 mergers and joint ventures across seven verticals in healthcare and
estimating that growth trend will be sustained in 2017). 
120. DaVita HealthCare Partners acquired physician group, The Everett Clinic, in 
2016.  Elizabeth Barker, How Consolidation is Reshaping Healthcare, HFMA LEADERSHIP
(Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.hfma.org/Leadership/E-Bulletins/2017/April/How_Consolidation_ 
Is_Reshaping_Health_Care/?trackref=auto.  In 2011, the Mayo Clinic started Mayo Clinic 
Care Network, which offering telehealth partnerships.  Id.  This trend reflects what Kaufman 
Hall, one of the leading healthcare consulting firms, described as “not a positive or negative
outcome [but] simply a reality that all organizations in the industry will have to undergo
some level of collaboration.” Id.
121. The managed care model is a contract between health insurer and care provider
for servicing a patient in exchange for fixed, or capitated, rate payments.  See ERNST &
YOUNG, MANAGED CARE 2.0: EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN? 4 (2013), https://webforms.ey.
com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-managed-care-2-0-everything-old-is-new-again/$FILE/ 
EY-managed-care-2-0-everything-old-is-new-again.pdf [https://perma.cc/67UG-RVLY].
Traditional managed care is represented by health management organizations (HMOs) and
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Federal authorities have also addressed the healthcare markets’ consolidation 
mode.  Former Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Kathleen Sebelius, observed that “[t]here is a tight balance between a coordinated 
care strategy and a monopoly.”122  Indeed, the ACA, by encouraging care
coordination and integration, is in tension with antitrust laws.123  However, 
federal antitrust regulations do not adequately reflect the changes the 
healthcare market is going through.
One of the new trends in healthcare structure is vertical integration,
which the federal agencies recognized in the vintage 1984 guidelines.124 
Since that time, though, the healthcare landscape has changed significantly. 
Healthcare is moving from being a series of boutique shops to a one-stop 
center. To illustrate this, Harold Miller, president and CEO of the Center 
for Healthcare Quality & Payment Reform, compared modern patient-
centered care to buying a TV: “A TV manufacturer like Sony may contract 
with many suppliers to build sets.  Like Sony does for TVs, an ACO brings 
together the different component parts of care for the patient . . . and ensures 
that all of the ‘parts work well together.’”125 
Vertical mergers today extend far beyond coordinating the activity of
providers within the healthcare delivery system.  The current trend embraces
provider–payer consolidations that work to reduce competition from rivals 
not included in the network.  It is well accepted in the industry and is now 
practically mandated by the ACA that the healthcare provider controls the 
patient.126  The insurer, on the other hand, controls the patient through the
plan, associated premiums, and deductibles.  The question is whether, together,
the provider and the insurer have the potential to control the market and 
even monopolize it by their collaboration.
Medicare Advantage plans, which require a beneficiary to select a primary care provider 
who coordinates their care and provides referrals for other services, including specialist 
care. Id. Essentially, the primary care provider serves as a gatekeeper in cost containment.
Participation in an ACO, on the contrary, is non-binding for the beneficiary; even though
alignment to a primary care provider is the corner stone of care coordination, there is no
lock-in and the beneficiary free to seek care elsewhere. Id. at 1–3; Jason Shafrin, What’s
the Difference Between an ACO and Managed Care, HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (Aug. 22,
2011), http://healthcare-economist.com/2011/08/22/whats-the-difference-between-an-aco-
and-managed-care [https://perma.cc/5RAL-KVBC]. 
122. David Balto, Antitrust: The Problem and Solution for Health Care, U.S. NEWS
(Apr. 12, 2013, 4:15 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/
2013/04/12/after-affordable-care-act-new-antitrust-laws-needed-in-health-care. 
123. Id.
 124. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at 29. 
125. Gold, supra note 107. 
126. ACO is the perfect example of such control over the patient. See infra Section 
III.C.3.
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A. New Players in Healthcare Can Avoid Antitrust Scrutiny 
To better understand the significance of antitrust implications for the 
healthcare landscape, familiarity with who actually comprises the business of
healthcare as it currently stands is essential.  This Comment intends to explore 
the “continuum of care” participants; therefore, it will concentrate on three 
major phenomena: (1) provider–payer as opposed to a standard health plan; 
(2) accountable care organizations; and (3) centralization of services for a 
patient. 
1. Provider–Payer Structure is an Alternative to 
Traditional Health Plans
A “provider” is colloquially understood as a physician, although the 
regulations expand the definition.127  In the current healthcare market, this
concept must be broadened from an individual authorized to provide care 
and must include hospitals, physicians, and mid-level medical staff, or, in
total, all players—care providers—in direct patient care.128 
Allowing healthcare providers to offer their own health plans is comparable
to “let[ting] the foxes run the henhouse.”129  Insurance companies have served
as middlemen, but healthcare providers are starting to cut them out by taking 
on risk through entering the insurance market themselves, which arguably 
aligns the optimal treatment supplied by the clinicians with the cost cutting 
and tight controls incentivized by the insurance arm.130  A number of traditional
health systems now also offer their insurance plans, including Catholic 
Health Initiatives, Sharp HealthCare, Sutter Health, Geisinger Health,
 127. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.125 (2017) (“[A healthcare provider is a] doctor of medicine or
osteopathy who is authorized to practice medicine or surgery [as well as] nurse practitioners,
nurse-midwives, clinical social workers and physician assistants . . . .”). 
128. Providers are further divided into primary, secondary, and tertiary—the difference
being the levels of care corresponding to the patients’ needs.  Kevin Grumbach & Thomas
Bodenheimer, The Organization of Health Care, 273 JAMA 160, 160 (1995).  In classical 
“managed care” primary care provider is in receipt of the capitated payment and are to
optimize and minimize the amount of care received from secondary and tertiary providers.
Id. at 161–62.  In the population health model, the optimization is, in principle, the same 
with one exception: the primary provider is often part of the health system that includes 
secondary and tertiary providers, which means they are essentially employees of the same
company.  Id. at 165–66. 
129. STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL 431 (2015). 
130. Id. at 432. 
 639
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Ascension Health, and Partners Health.131 Providers are forced to provide
value care rather than volume of treatments, and insurance premiums serve 
as a steady additional source of revenue.132  More importantly, the organization 
gains market share through the insured population.133  The dual role of provider
and payer permits the health system to fully own the patient data along
with the information on treatment costs, thus enabling tighter control over 
care and cost management, which is a cornerstone in the world of bundled 
payments and “pay-for-performance.”134 
Today nearly 52% of insurance products are currently represented through 
plans owned by health systems such as Kaiser, Providence, Geisinger, and 
Inova.135  Many of these payer-plans are multi-state entities; therefore,
federal antitrust regulation is more appropriate than the state “business of
insurance.”136  In addition to the jurisdictional issues, the nature of the
arrangement creates confusion over the identity of the lead antitrust 
enforcement agency, namely, whether the DOJ or FTC shall oversee
assessment of the arrangement.137 
Kaiser is not a new model138 but although it was previously an outlier
in the FFS world, now, in the Value Based Purchase (VBP) care environment, 
131. Ken Perez, Healthcare Providers as Payers Too: Not So Wild an Idea, HFM
BLOG (May 9, 2016), https://www.hfma.org/Content.aspx?id=48022.  The Advisory Board 
conducted a survey of over 100 hospitals and health systems; 34% of respondents already
owned health plans and 21% were going to start a plan within the next five years. Id.
passed; it shifts physician reimbursement to VBP alternative payment models along with 
132. Id.
 133. Id.
134. In 2015, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) was 
proposed physician fee bonuses for quality and for participation in the alternative payment 
models. See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
10, § 101, 129 Stat. 87, 92–93.  If a physician is not participating in any alternative payment 
models, his reimbursement is adjusted to a merit-based fee schedule accounting for quality
measures, use of resources, and implementation of electronic health records. See id.
 135. Susan Morse, 25 Biggest Provider-Sponsored Health Plans Include Some of the 
Nation’s Biggest Systems, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.healthcare 
financenews.com/news/25-biggest-provider-sponsored-health-plans-include-some-nations- 
biggest-systems [https://perma.cc/SD33-GN5G]; see also Bob Herman, More Health Systems 
Launch Insurance Plans Despite Caveats, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www. 
modernhealthcare.com/article/20150404/MAGAZINE/304049981 [https://perma.cc/W4NB-
EPTN].
136. The McCarran–Ferguson Act provides that the regulation of insurance is within
the states’ authority.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2018). The Health Maintenance Organization Act
delegates the regulation of HMO’s to the states.  Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2018)). 
But the FTC and DOJ are both federal agencies, thus the controversy arises whether the state
immunity would apply or whether the agencies should still oversee the providers.
137. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
138. See About Kaiser Permanente, KAISER PERMANENTE, https://share.kaiserpermanente.
org/about-us/about-kaiser-permanente/ [https://perma.cc/4LVK-2WY3].  Kaiser’s model 
640
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it is becoming a new standard for cost efficiency.139  Health systems form
partnerships between healthcare providers and health plans.  For example,
in 2014, Anthem Blue Cross Vivity was created as a partnership in Southern
California between Anthem Blue Cross and seven hospital groups in Los
Angeles and Orange counties.140  Together, the partners share in the profits
and losses, so the basis of the arrangement is collaboration in care and
financial decisions.141  This author was unable to find a record of whether
the Vivity partnership came under the antitrust enforcement radar, but such
a deal certainly has the potential to raise concerns, as it probably should.142 
is peculiar because a payer employs its own network of physicians and thus has exclusive 
control over the patient and maximum care coordination. See JESSE PINES ET AL., KAISER
PERMANENTE –CALIFORNIA: A MODEL FOR INTEGRATED CARE FOR THE ILL AND INJURED 3– 
4 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/KaiserFormatted_1505
04RH-with-image.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY2H-JSPD].  Kaiser owns hospitals and physician
offices and offers a wide range of services practically eliminating the need to seek services
out of the Kaiser network. Id.  Despite the seeming integration, Kaiser is a fragmented system:
it comprises separate entities—Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 
and Permanente Medical Groups—that contract exclusively with each other and share risk.
Id.
 139. At The Atlantic’s Healthcare Forum in 2014, it was observed that “Kaiserification” of
the healthcare system is currently happening through consolidation of health insurance 
companies and healthcare providers, or “integrating insurance with delivery function.” 
Rob Garver, Hospitals Plot the End of Insurance Companies, FISCAL TIMES (Mar. 27,
2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/03/27/Hospitals-Plot-End-Insurance-
Companies (quoting Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel, chairman of the Department of Medical Ethics 
and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania).
140. Anthem Blue Cross Partners with Seven LA & Orange County Health Systems 
to Launch Vivity, ANTHEM BLUECROSS (Sept. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Anthem Blue Cross 
Partners], https://www.anthem.com/ca/press/california/anthem-blue-cross-partners-with-
seven-la-amp-orange-county-health-systems-to-launch-vivity/ [https://perma.cc/QE92-FE38]. 
141. Id. (referring to the collaboration as “the trend of moving toward a structure that
financially rewards activities to keep patients healthy”); see also One Year Later, How is
Vivity Stacking up to Kaiser? Checking in with MemorialCare CEO Dr. Barry Arbuckle, 
BECKER’S HOSP. CFO REP. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/ 
finance/one-year-later-how-is-vivity-stacking-up-to-kaiser-checking-in-with-memorialcare-
ceo-dr-barry-arbuckle.html [https://perma.cc/4LVK-2WY3] (stating that the goal of Vivity is
“sharing the risk . . . [while] aligning the incentive to collaborate with one another”).
142. “As health insurance companies and health care providers increasingly enter
each other’s territories and the lines between their conventional business models begin to 
blur, competition will eventually undermine those who adhere to the old, inflexible regime.”
David C. Szostak, Vertical Integration in Health Care: The Regulatory Landscape, 17 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 65, 72 (2015).  The question is whether this is a natural process 
of eliminating the old-fashioned and inflexible players or whether that is more of monopolizing
the market and infringement of free competition.  Based on the approach, novel partnership 
structures are worthy of a deep antitrust review.
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The DOJ examined the Highmark and West Penn Allegheny Health 
System (WPAHS) affiliation and allowed the participants to proceed, this 
being one of the few affiliations that was actually examined.143  Highmark
is the Pennsylvania region’s dominant health insurance company, a Blue
Cross/Blue Shield licensee, and WPAHS is a hospital network; the DOJ
called this affiliation agreement “a vertical combination [that] can reduce 
competition by limiting entry or expansion by third parties.”144  The challenge
to the vertical merger did not stand the scrutiny.  This Comment further analyzes 
the transaction in Part III. 
Another of the few publicly known challenges to vertical integration, 
although not resulting in a judgment, was Omni Healthcare.145 The issued
opinion, however, addressed the question of whether vertical transactions
can violate antitrust laws and held that arrangements between insurers and 
hospitals are prohibited as a matter of law.146  Omni Healthcare sued Health 
First for violations of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.147  Health First 
was the market leader in its region’s inpatient hospital services with 86.8% 
market share; it operated physician practices and offered a range of health 
insurance plans through its insurance arm.148  Omni alleged that Health First
required its in-network providers to refer patients only within the Health
First system.149  Omni also alleged that Health First engaged in market
monopolization by refusing to contract for inpatient hospital services with
insurers other than Health First.150  The court denied summary judgement 
finding there was a triable issue of fact and that a joint venture between a
hospital and an insurer can violate § 1 of the Sherman Act if exclusive
 143. Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close 
Its Investigation of Highmark’s Affiliation Agreement with West Penn Allegheny Health 




145. Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1509-Orl-37DAB, 2016 
WL 4272164 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2016).  This case became the basis of an article on provider– 
payer vertical integration that discussed issues peculiar to managed care, which, however, 
can be extended to post-enactment of the ACA period, integrated healthcare in general.
See generally  BRIAN J. MILLER & GEORGE L. WOLFE, MANAGED CARE MARKETPLACE:
GROWING DRIVERS OF PAYER-PROVIDER VERTICAL INTEGRATION (2017) (analyzing vertical
integration models through the Omni Healthcare decision). 
146. Omni Healthcare, 2016 WL 4272164, at *16. 
147. Id. at *11, *13
 148. Id. at *14. 
149. Id. at *3, *13. 
150. Id. at *3. The claim was specific to Medicare Advantage market, but it raises an
important issue: can a hospital system exclusively contract with one insurer that it happens 
to own? See MILLER & WOLFE, supra note 145, at 3.
642
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dealing is established.151  The case settled,152 and the court did not proceed
with the analysis of vertical integration.153  Health First, however, alluded 
to any growth being “a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident.”154  It would have been extremely interesting to see the
case tried because it would present a concrete challenge to vertical integrations. 
2. 	Accountable Care Organizations Promote Clinical Integration and 
Impede on the Traditional Antitrust Analysis 
The ACA designed ACOs as a network of healthcare providers sharing 
financial and medical responsibility for patient care while striving to optimize 
treatment and eliminate unnecessary procedures and spending.155  ACOs
have a financial incentive to avoid unnecessary procedures because they
are entitled to a portion of the savings as long as they meet quality targets.156 
The idea is to tie quality to value as well as to focus on preventive care and 
population management instead of FFS reimbursement.157 The ACO structure 
implies alignment between payer and provider through management and 
administrative arrangements.  It is a shared risk model, where provider commits
to sharing costs for patient care above a specified benchmark.158  Providers—
physicians participating in an ACO, hospitals, home health agencies, that
is, everyone providing services to the patient—continue to receive traditional 
payments from the payer, which is CMS in the original design, but will also
receive a bonus payment if they perform at or above the specified quality
151.  Omni Healthcare, 2016 WL 4272164, at *18. 
152. Naeem S. Miller, One Day into Trial, Health First Settles Case, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Aug. 16, 2016, 5:25 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/health/os-health-
first-settles-case-with-omni-20160816-story.html. 
153.  See generally Omni Healthcare, 2016 WL 4272164. 
154. Id. at *13 (quoting Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.2d 1288, 
1293–94 (11th Cir. 2004)). This allusion, which is typical in antitrust setting, serves as an
example of reasons as to why antitrust cases present a challenge for the courts.
155.  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2018) (“[ACO is] a shared savings program . . . that promotes
accountability for a patient population and coordinates [services] for high quality and
efficient service delivery.”); Gold, supra note 107 (“An ACO is a network of doctors and 
hospitals that shares financial and medical responsibility for providing coordinated care to
patients in hopes of limiting unnecessary spending.”).
156. Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, The Economics of Medicare Accountable
Care Organizations, 9 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 11, 12 (2016); About the CMS 
Innovation Center, CMS.GOV (May 29, 2918), https://innovation.cms.gov/About/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/6XDT-5V73].
157. See Gold, supra note 107. 
158. See id.
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standards and if the ACO’s average per capita expenditures are lower than 
the benchmark.159  If the average per capita expenditures exceed the
benchmark, the ACO may be responsible for making a payment to CMS
for their share of the loss.160  In addition, the ACO will also bear the fixed 
cost of investments into the program: potentially a care management program, 
or investments into an electronic health records system, should it not be 
available originally.161 
Obviously, for the ACO concept to work, healthcare providers must align 
their patient care efforts and have full access to the patient information.  In 
the Medicare world, as CMS pioneered the ACO development,162 patients are
not restricted to seeking care from a certain doctor, or even a specific network 
of doctors, and can opt out from data sharing.163  Financial responsibility
for the patient care, however, still remains with the ACO.164 Along with 
the strict quality criteria, this differentiates ACOs from traditional health 
management organizations (HMOs).165 Another important difference is that
the ACO is a “health care provider-driven” organization, whereas the HMO 
is typically fronted by an insurer.166 
This Comment will discuss two broad categories of ACOs, Medicare 
and non-Medicare—or commercial.  Although Medicare and commercial 
ACOs are quite similar in their concept, they must be treated separately, 
mostly due to the difference in payers and resulting differences in formation 
criteria as well as applicable antitrust analysis. 
159. About the CMS Innovation Center, supra note 156. 
160. See Pioneer ACO Model, CMS.GOV (Aug. 28, 2018), https://innovation.cms. 
gov/initiatives/Pioneer-aco-model [https://perma.cc/3CQ8-VQM4]. 
161. See Gold, supra note 107. 
162. Currently, CMS offers multiple participating options for Medicare ACOs including
the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP)—which served as a prototype in the ACA 
and currently has three possible paths—the Pioneer ACO model, and the Next Generation 
ACO model.  Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs): General Information, CMS.GOV 
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/ACO/ [https://perma.cc/7F7W-U54D].
The programs are similar in nature but differ in the specific ways of calculating benchmark 
and savings. See id.
 163. See generally DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., THE PIONEER ACO MODEL: EXPERIENCE THROUGH A NEW MODEL OF CARE (2011)
[hereinafter PIONEER ACO MODEL]; FOUND. ACCOUNTABLE CARE NETWORK, INFORMATIVE 
FAQS ON THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM PROVIDED BY CMS, http://www.
iefmc.org/Images/FACN%20ACO%20FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ALZ-Y9NX].
164. See Gold, supra note 107. 
165. The ACO model’s underlying concept is value, whereas the HMO model has 
historically focused on financial aspects, often disregarding the quality element of providing
care.  See Shafrin, supra note 121. 
166. DYLAN LANDERS-NELSON ET AL., THE IMPACT OF ACCOUNTABLE CARE: EMPLOYER 
PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTABLE CARE 4 (2015). 
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a. Medicare ACOs: Standard Model 
Traditionally, ACOs are viewed as Medicare creatures.  The “Shared
Savings Program”—the underlying idea of the ACO—was established by
the ACA167 to promote accountability and care coordination for Medicare
patient populations.168  Section 3022 of the ACA provides that “groups of
providers . . . meeting [specific] criteria . . . may work together [and are] eligible
to receive payments for shared savings” as long as they “meet quality 
performance standards.”169  Coordinated care intends to avoid duplication 
of services and prevent medical errors.170 
Medicare ACOs are powered by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) and provide care to Medicare Part A and Part B patients;
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) is the agency 
in charge of those innovative programs, which vary in risk sharing percentage 
and quality requirements.171  Participation in ACO models is “voluntary”
for care providers.172  However, there obviously are incentives driving eligible
providers to form ACOs.  As of August 2017, there were 480 Medicare “ACOs 
serving over nine million beneficiaries” across the United States.173 
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans also participate in ACOs through network 
and access requirements that are controlling the market.174  These trends
are the early birds of private market concentrations, which are meant to 
167.  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2018). 
168. Susan S. DeSanti, ACO Antitrust Guidelines: Coordination Among Federal Agencies, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2011, at 1, 1.
169.  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj. 




 172. Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs): General Information, supra note 162. 
173. Virgil Dickinson, Medicare to Divulge when a Doc’s Patient is in an ACO, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170823/
NEWS/170829954 [https://perma.cc/42ZN-HKW9].
174. MA plans are offered by private insurance companies through their contracts 
with Medicare. Different Types of Medicare Advantage Plans, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www. 
medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-health-plans/different-types-of-medicare-
health-plans-.html [https://perma.cc/LU8E-ZFGH].  The difference between the MA and 
ACO model is that MA beneficiaries—unlike ACO beneficiaries—choose to enroll and
are not free to seek care elsewhere; MA, however, is value-based, similar to ACO. Pioneer 























    














   
  
 
shift risks and combine financial and economic elements of the care continuum. 
As of early 2015, 132 payers, including such notable commercial insurers 
as Aetna, Cigna, and UnitedHealth, had at least one accountable care 
contract.175 
To be eligible to participate in a Medicare ACO, an organization must 
meet certain criteria including ability to align the required number of
beneficiaries, or patients, it is responsible for.176  Again, the criteria are 
significantly easier to meet for larger systems.
b. Non-Medicare ACOs: Evolving Standard
Commercial, non-Medicare, ACOs are appealing to providers partially 
because non-government payers are significantly less rigid than CMS in
financial risk-sharing arrangements and are more likely to account for the 
individual ACO’s capacities in calculating quality metrics.177  These ACOs
are neither officially defined nor tracked,178 and therefore, are not required 
to go through the same initial scrutiny as the Medicare ACOs. The process
of commercial ACO development is significantly more efficient and fast,
as federal regulations do not set entry barriers.179
 175. David Muhlestein, Growth and Dispersion of Accountable Care Organizations 
in 2015, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/31/ 
growth-and-dispersion-of-accountable-care-organizations-in-2015-2/. 
176. The eligibility criteria will be discussed further in this Comment. See infra note 
248.  Meanwhile, it is enough to understand that the population alignment is based on strictly
outpatient services and that the alignment is conducted through the participating physicians— 
that is, primary care providers.  See infra note 248. 
177.  Robert Belfort, Lowering Risk for Commercial ACOs, H&HN (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.hhnmag.com/articles/4184-lowering-risk-for-commercial-acos [https://perma.cc/
DR8W-6793]; see also Jesse Migneault, Understanding the Basics of Accountable Care 
Organizations, HEALTHPAYER INTELLIGENCE (May 23, 2017), https://healthpayerintelligence. 
com/news/understanding-the-basics-of-accountable-care-organizations [https://perma.cc/
PG44-7TV2] (naming the following as three main reasons for the growing appeal of the 
commercial ACOs: an “opportunity to improve quality and efficiency, jumpstart population
health improvement, and the acceptance that changes in medical payments are an inevitable
part of the healthcare landscape”).
178. Commercial Groups Driving Force Behind ACOs Development, DEFINITIVE 
HEALTHCARE (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.definitivehc.com/news/commercial-groups-
driving-force-behind-aco-development [https://perma.cc/Z9MC-EKCR] (“Commercial ACOs 
cover millions of lives but are often overlooked because they have no public reporting
requirements, their existence is not always announced, and rarely do providers or insurers 
give a complete account of their performance, unless one does especially well.”).
179. See id. (“According to a recent Leavitt Partners analysis, shared risk and shared
savings agreements between providers and commercial insurers covered 17.2 million lives 
in April 2016, over twice as many as Medicare and Medicare ACOs combined.  Definitive 
Healthcare currently counts over 500 commercial agreements, nearly 400 of which are directed 
by one of five major insurers.”).
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ACOs represent a more recent trend ultimately being driven by large 
employers.  Available ACO models of the kind may be created by the employer 
independently—“direct-to-employer” ACO—developed as a joint venture
with an existing local ACO provider, or established as payer-directed; this 
model is most similar to a traditional self-funded insurance arrangement.180 
Under each model, employers may or may not share in the ACO’s savings—
that is determined by the contractual arrangement, and obviously, the 
availability of accurate claims data will provide for establishing accurate
benchmarks. Boeing181 and Qualcomm182 are among the many employers
embarking on the ACO journey.  There are multiple incentives for a large 
employer to become self-insured. Cutting the middleman is one, be it a third-
party insurance administrator or an insurance company handling a close
network for this employer.  Direct-to-employer ACO is basically health 
insurance on steroids. 
UnitedHealthcare, one of the leading health insurance carriers, launched its
own ACO, NexusACO, on the national scale with participating providers
from fifteen markets, including California.183  NexusACO is made available to
self-funded employers with over 100 employees.184  That is highly reminiscent
 180. MICHAEL T. SANDWITH, THE ACO AND EMPLOYER OPPORTUNITIES: ACO SERIES 
PART 3, at 3 (2011),  https://www.healthstream.com/docs/default-source/master-document-
repository/wp_it_theacoandemployeropportunities.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/F7UV-7CC6].
181.  Boeing started offering their first ACO in 2014 and expanded the offerings to more
areas since then; it employs more than 150,000 people across the United States.  Marty Stempniak, 
Will Boeing Change Health Care?, H&HN (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.hhnmag.com/ 
articles/6709-will-boeing-change-health-care [https://perma.cc/R3LP-J2XE]. ACO options are
currently available to 30,000 employees in the Puget Sound, 6,000 employees in South Carolina, 
13,000 employees in St. Louis, and 15,000 employees in Southern California.  Melanie Evans,
Boeing Negotiates Directly with More Health Systems, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150804/NEWS/150809961 [https://perma.cc/
XB7F-U9GN].  Although Boeing has not publicly announced how many employees chose 
the ACO participation, the company stated it was more than expected. See Richard Stolz, 
Boeing Expands its ACO Plan to Cover 15,000 Employees in Southern California, EBN
(July 11, 2016, 8:34 PM), https://www.benefitnews.com/news/boeing-expands-its-aco-
plan-to-cover-15-000-employees-in-southern-california [https://perma.cc/2VK8-689M].
182. Qualcomm contracted with Scripps Health in San Diego to offer an ACO plan
to over 12,000 local employees.  Brad Graves, Qualcomm First S.D. Firm to Contract with 
Scripps ACO, SAN DIEGO BUS. J. (June 7, 2017), https://www.sdbj.com/news/2017/jun/07/ 
qualcomm-first-sd-firm-contract-scripps-aco/ [https://perma.cc/E3ZN-LGU2].
183. Bruce Japsen, UnitedHealth Group Launches National ACO, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2016, 
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/11/01/unitedhealth-group-launches-
national-aco/#70aab3a74eca [https://perma.cc/7MD7-AJFU]. 
184. Id. (reporting that more than twelve undisclosed employers have already signed 
up).
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of a narrow-network plan, just with a different regulatory mechanism.
The regulatory framework is not prepared to address the development of 
the ACO model into the commercial market.  Current rules are tailored to 
a single-payer, non-negotiable environment. 
B. Application of Existing Antitrust Principles to the 

New Models Lacks Clarity
 
When the existing FTC and DOJ Statements of Antitrust Enforcement 
Policy in Healthcare were issued back in 1996, the then-FTC Commissioner 
stated that the guidelines “should reflect greater receptiveness to new and
innovative forms of provider arrangements.”185  The official guidelines provide
a certain leeway for new developments in any industry, but do they adequately
govern the changed healthcare landscape? 
Traditionally, violations of antitrust law are analyzed either under the 
per se rule186 or under the “rule of reason”.187 The per se rule is especially 
185. DAVID BALTO, MAKING HEALTH REFORM WORK 7 (2011), https://cdn.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/aco_competition.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2VHQ-PPK7] (quoting Christine Varney). 
186. Per se illegality applies to “agreements or practices which . . . [have a] pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue” and therefore are unreasonable.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).  Per se rules are enforced in the uniform 
manner across all industries.  Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 720 (1991). The classic examples of
per se offenses are price fixing between competitors—charging an agreed-upon amount 
for a service; boycotting—agreements not to deal with certain suppliers or customers, or
market allocation—competitors dividing the market between themselves. Jeffrey L. Cohen,
How Antitrust Laws Hinder the Goals of Healthcare Reform, MED. ECON. (May 10, 2012), 
http://www.medicaleconomics.com/category-47287/how-antitrust-laws-hinder-goals-
healthcare-reform [https://perma.cc/4VQU-2LXZ]. The per se doctrine defines categories of
business transactions that are illegal and present anticompetitive behavior which is outright 
prohibited; the caveat being that the “courts [are] careful not to adopt a per se approach until
they ha[ve] gained enough experience to be confident that a particular restriction would
have an anticompetitive impact in nearly all cases.”  Piraino, supra, at 692.  Per se rules are
hardly applicable to the complex concept of care management which is highly specialized and 
unique to healthcare. As applied specifically to healthcare, per Deborah Feinstein, former 
FTC Commissioner, the following matters:
Does the proposed arrangement offer the potential for pro-consumer cost 
savings or quality improvements in the provision of healthcare services? Is there 
bona fide integration or is this simply a mechanism to enhance leverage with
payers through joint negotiation?  Even if there is bona fide integration, are any
price or other agreements among participants regarding the terms on which they
will deal with healthcare insurers reasonably necessary to achieve the benefits 
of the collaboration?  If the answer to these questions is “yes,” then the
collaboration is not considered a per se illegal agreement . . . .
FEINSTEIN, supra note 96, at 4.
187. Under rule of reason analysis, “the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of 
a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
648
POST KAPCHINSKIY PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2018 1:31 PM       
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important in working through price fixing schemes.  In this case, the violation 
of law is so obvious that it is not necessary to weigh it against the potential 
benefits to the society and marketplace.188 Currently, however, the rule of
reason is becoming fundamental.  Under this approach, the circumstances of
the transaction or initiative must be carefully considered to interpret impacts
to the competition.189  Some agreements may be found valid under the rule
of reason even if they are highly questionable under the per se rule.190 Under
the “rule of reason” analysis, courts first determine whether the structured 
deal has a measurable impact on competition and, if so, how it balances 
against the efficiencies created. 
Even setting aside the novel character of the models under review, vertical
mergers overall have not frequently been a subject of antitrust challenge.191 
Partially, vertical integration and the concept of patient care continuum have
been reflected in-managed care, also known as HMOs.  However, HMO
restraint on competition.”  Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
Because the language of the Sherman Act § 1 is extremely broad and prohibits “[e]very 
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade,” it can easily be applied to 
literally any commercial transaction.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).  The rule of reason approach, 
therefore, has been applied to only challenge transactions where the restraint of trade is 
unreasonable. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (stating 
that since the Standard Oil decision, “most restraints” are analyzed under the rule of reason). 
The rule of reason balances the anticompetitive impacts of a transaction and the business 
benefits, thus determining the reasonableness of the transaction—obviously, reasonable
transactions are not challenged. FEINSTEIN, supra note 96, at 4 (“Ultimately, [the FTC] make[s]
a determination as to whether a particular agreement, on balance, benefits consumers or is 
likely to diminish quality, reduce output, or increase price.”). 
188. One of the first cases to emphasize that antitrust laws applied unilaterally to
healthcare was Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society where the Court determined 
that agreement amount physicians to set maximum prices was a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 361. 
189. Similar to the totality of circumstances test, under the rule of reason, the overall 
competitive effect is analyzed by focusing on “the state of competition with, as compared 
to without, the relevant agreement.”  U.S.DEP’T OF JUSTICE &FED.TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 4 (2000).  Factors utilized in the 
analysis are flexible and may include business purpose, market, and independent competitive 
advantage. See id.
 190. Hearing, supra note 21, at 6 (statement of Sharis A. Pozen, Chief of Staff and 
Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (asserting 
clinical integration “with its emphasis on realizing benefits for consumers—justifies rule-
of-reason treatment for price setting or other agreements that might otherwise be per
se illegal”).
191. See generally Jaime Stilson et al., Reading the Tea Leaves: Evaluating Potential 
Antitrust Concerns in Vertical Mergers Between Insurers and Health Care Providers, 30 
ANTITRUST 11 (2015). 
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trading quality for 
to avoid. 
C. Providers May Have Anticompetitive Motives to 

Participate in an ACO Model 

The influx of new ACOs in the market may evidence that they are becoming 
a vehicle for achieving efficiencies and a tool of “defensive consolidation
in response to new payment models.”193  Among the incentives determining
why providers choose to participate in an ACO—either Medicare or private—
the following are most commonly stated in varying interpretations: money,
market expansion, and control over the patients—all of which have direct 
antitrust implications and concerns. 
1. Money as an Incentive to Participate in an ACO
Discussing money is a faux pas in healthcare.  However, in the business 
of healthcare, compensation and bottom-line keep the care industry afloat. 
Keeping costs low—the underlying goal of an ACO—can be achieved by
incentivizing physicians to avoid unnecessary and duplicative services, such 
as hospitalizations, excessive tests, and procedures—as well as by utilizing 
cheaper providers. Usually, the primary concern of cost efficiency is
sacrificing necessary services in the name of savings.194 Another opportunity
to keep costs low is the reduction in administrative costs through 
standardization and centralization of services that directly improve the operating
margin. Lower expenditures provide an opportunity to keep prices low 
and indirectly eliminate or disfavor more expensive competitors.  It is 
expensive to form and run an ACO, suggesting that larger organizations are
better set up for entrance into the program; thus, mergers and consolidations
are encouraged because organizations prefer to either have existing 
infrastructure for an ACO start-up or to absorb risks of ACO formation.195
 192. See Sage et al., supra note 17, at 39. 
193. Hannah T. Neprash et al., Little Evidence Exists to Support the Expectation that
Providers Would Consolidate to Enter New Payment Models, 36 HEALTH AFF. 346, 346 
(2017).
194. This results in a bad reputation of HMO plans and traditional managed care. 
See supra note 121. 
195. ACO start-up costs are estimated to be at least $30 million in a midsize market. 
Will ACO Show Financial Return?, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:13 PM), https:// 
www.fiercehealthcare.com/healthcare/will-acos-show-financial-returns [https://perma.cc/ 
Q9G9-BZL9] (quoting Tom Scully, former CMS Administrator).  CMS estimates the cost
of operating an ACO at $1.8 million in the first year; however, providers believe the true 
first-year operating costs exceed this estimate.  Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 156, at 13. 
Another estimate for start-up costs, coming from a healthcare consultant, is $1,040 per aligned
beneficiary—remember that an ACO must have a minimum of 5,000 beneficiaries to be
650
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2. Market Expansion as an Incentive to Participate in an ACO 
ACO market expansion is achieved through strategic partnerships.  Partners 
share not only savings generated by the ACO, but also losses.196  Thus, it
is important to choose the right team to play on.  The choice of not joining 
may pose a risk of being left out of the network that other providers form 
and the consequential loss of market share. In 2011, at the dawn of “the ACO 
era,” 8% of physicians either were already participating in an ACO or 
planned to join an ACO within a year.197  Two years after, in 2013, the
percentage tripled: 34% of physicians participating in the study were either in
an ACO or planned to participate in one within a year.198  California is
a perfect example: it is home sixty-seven ACOs, more than any other state.199 
By 2022, 60% of the state population is expected to receive integrated care
from an ACO provider.200  This trend could only mean that there is an incentive
to consolidate and that single players are not expected to survive, at least
easily. 
3. Control Over the Patients as an Incentive to Participate in an ACO
ACO control over the patient usually implies control over the care continuum 
and sets the primary focus on providers being proactive in preventive services 
rather than treatments.201  The control is moving from the insurance companies, 
with various incentives, to the providers.202 
Another angle to look at, however, is control over patient care choices. 
ACOs are designed to maximize the quality of care without sacrificing the
eligible to participate.  Howard Larkin, ACO or No?, H&HN (May 13, 2014), http://www.
hhnmag.com/articles/4208-aco-or-no. 
196. Anthem Blue Cross Partners, supra note 140. 
197.  Leslie Kane, Physician Compensation: Doctors Adapting to a New Reality, 
MEDSCAPE (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/823435_2 [https://perma.cc/ 
5GEB-2GSH]. 
198. Id.
 199. BRENT D. FULTON ET AL., DRIVERS OF HEALTH EXPENDITURE GROWTH IN
CALIFORNIA: FORECASTS AND PROGRESS ON DELIVERY SYSTEM INTEGRATION 14 (2014),
http://berkeleyhealthcareforum.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/BerkeleyForum_ExpBrief2
_2014dec1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDV7-BE6X]. 
200. Id. at 13. 
201. See OLIVER WYMAN, ACO UPDATE: ACCOUNTABLE CARE AT A TIPPING POINT 3 
(2014).
202. See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 156, at 12 (providing that savings increase 
physicians’ “incentives for efficiency”).
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patient’s right to choose their care means.203  Although ACO-aligned patients
are free to seek care elsewhere, the ACO is still responsible for the incurred 
costs.204  The ACOs still control the patient and are entitled to receive claims
data unless the patient opts out of data sharing.205  Accordingly, ACO providers 
become informed about the competitors’ prices and sometimes care levels 
and billing practices.206  ACOs may or may not use competitors’ pricing 
to their advantage as a means of informing patients about treatment costs to 
influence their care choices.207  Price information may also be used as a tool 
to raise prices, along with the perceived market power ACOs have.208 
D. Deficiencies of the Existing Regulations 
There is little federal regulation over the transactions involving vertical 
mergers overall, especially with participation of insurance companies.
Federal agencies admittedly recognize that integration of two companies 
at various spectrums of the industry chain is generally beneficial for consumers 
and results in major efficiencies.209  Although “some vertical mergers present 
competitive problems,” the general view on vertical mergers is significantly 
more favorable than on horizontal mergers.210 
The discussion below is based on the nature of vertical integration and 
on its familiarity to the antitrust agencies due to its novice—or not so
much—nature.  On one side of the continuum are vertical mergers, which 
are the most customary, or traditional.  Next is vertical integration that is
newer and more difficult to analyze.  The other side of the continuum includes 
ACOs that this Comment perceives as the grey area of vertical integration
analysis. 
203. The patient’s absolute freedom to choose a care provider and seek services without
a required referral is one of the primary features distinguishing an ACO from an HMO.
Id. at 13. 
204. See id. at 14.
 205. PIONEER ACO MODEL, supra note 163, at 3–4. 
206. Medicare ACOs receive claims data for all aligned beneficiaries monthly—
regardless of where these claims are incurred, the only exception are alcohol and chemical
dependency claims—and can perform extensive analysis not only on the services provided
by the ACO network but also on services provided elsewhere.  Id.
 207. See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 156, at 13 (questioning whether lower costs 
would be a positive factor for the patient because often higher price serves as an indicator 
of higher quality). 
208. See id.
209. The FTC has stated: “Vertical mergers can generate significant cost savings and 
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1. Vertical Mergers: Expansion of the Classic Antitrust Challenge
There is certain regulatory involvement in consolidation of existing
companies positioned vertically—although different and probably less 
than in horizontal merger activities.211  The analysis starts with determining 
whether a dominant company is involved.212  The key question is how the
federal regulators determine dominancy in the market place, especially in 
the light of the changing healthcare landscape.
In scrutinizing the affiliation between Highmark—the Blue Cross affiliate 
operating in Pennsylvania—and WPAHS—a hospital system in Western
Pennsylvania, the DOJ focused on the importance of the parties in
Pennsylvania market.213  Highmark is “the region’s dominant health
insurance company” and “WPAHS is the second-largest hospital network
in the Pittsburgh region.”214  The analysis also emphasized potential for 
the parties’ collaboration with other players and looked at past experiences.215 
The DOJ allowed the transaction to proceed, but the key point is that their 
analysis was case-based and did not employ standard metrics.  This is one
of the challenges of vertical integration analysis.  The parties are not directly 
competing with each other, but their integration may impact competitors 
in both markets. 
The analysis in question also did not consider prior history of the participants. 
Two years prior to the vertical merger with Hallmark, WPAHS sued its 
major competitor in the Pittsburgh market, University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center (UPMC), challenging its collaboration with Hallmark at the time
and raising antitrust concerns.216 WPAHS’s market share was slightly over
22% of the regional market, whereas UPMC was the market leader with
211. 	  Aside from the number of vertical merger cases, vertical 
mergers involve firms that do not operate in the same market.  It necessarily follows 
that such mergers produce no immediate change in the level of concentration in 
any relevant market . . . . Although [vertical] mergers are less likely than horizontal
mergers to create competitive problems, they are not invariably innocuous. 
NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at 23. 
212. ANTHONY SWISHER, VERTICAL INTEGRATION: DOES IT MATTER THAT IT’S 
HEALTHCARE? 2 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
healthlaw/07_dominant_payer_dominant_provider.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9CFQ-XDZ3].
(citing Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 171–73 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
213. 
214. 
DOJ Statement, supra note 143. 
Id.
 215. Id.
216. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010)
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market share of around 55%.217  Highmark and UPMC entered into an
agreement to allegedly protect each other from competition, and the court 
found that the parties indeed engaged in uncompetitive behaviors that hurt 
WPAHS.218 
In 2014, Anthem Blue Cross announced a partnership with seven competing
Los Angeles hospital groups, namely, “Cedars-Sinai, Good Samaritan
Hospital, Huntington Memorial Hospital, MemorialCare Health System,
PIH Health, Torrance Memorial Medical Center, and the UCLA Health
System.”219  This deal does not have expected integration between the hospital
participants or between the insurer and the hospitals.220  However, both 
the insurer and the provider will share financial risk and engage in joint 
care coordination.221  This deal is marketed as a competing product to the
Kaiser Permanente System and has the goal of having prices at least similar
to, if not lower than, Kaiser’s.222  The partnership will arguably have control
over the market and may present an issue to already struggling stand-alone 
hospitals or nonparticipating health systems. 
2. Vertical Integration: Lacuna in the Antitrust Framework 
Hospital systems recognize and respond to the fact that health insurance 
“does not represent the consumer [and is] not the proxy for the consumer 
interest.”223  A special loophole in vertical integration provides for vertical
expansion of an existing company through offering of a new product or a 
service—a de novo entry.  New health plan formation by an existing healthcare 
system would be an example of such transaction.224  “Organic growth” of 
217. Id. at 91. 
218. Id. at 93, 110. 
219. MAIURO, supra note 107, at 9 (citing Dale Tate, UCLA Health System, Anthem 
Blue Cross Join L.A. and Orange County Partners to Launch Vivity, UCLA NEWSROOM
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-health-system-anthem-blue-cross- 
join-l-a-and-orange-county-partners-to-launch-vivity [https://perma.cc/PC3P-SY6T]); see
also Anthem Blue Cross Partners with 7 LA/OC Health Systems to Launch Vivity, TORRANCE 
MEMORIAL (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.torrancememorial.org/News_Center/2014/September/ 
Anthem_Blue_Cross_Partners_with_7_LA_OC_Health_S.aspx [https://perma.cc/D8J7-4H4Y].
220. Integration between the hospitals is horizontal.  Technically, it ought to be reviewed
by the FTC.  Integration between the insurer and the hospitals is vertical and therefore subject
to the DOJ review. 
221. MAIURO, supra note 107, at 9. 
222. See id.
 223. Health Industry Consolidation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the 
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 13 (2011) [hereinafter Health Industry Hearing]
(prepared statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action 
Fund).
224. Vertical integration, as David Szostak notes, may be as simple as “a pharmacy opening
up a line of retail clinics, employing nurse practitioners or other professionals.”  Szostak, 
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the existing firm is not typically challenged by the federal antitrust enforcers,
as it is merely a new product offering and does not involve a merger or an
acquisition.225 
In New York, North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System, currently
Northwell Health, started CareConnect, becoming the state’s first provider- 
owned commercial health plan.226  As the health system’s first venture in the
insurance business, the new plan competes with well-established and larger 
carriers on New York State’s health insurance exchange.227  In Georgia,
Piedmont Healthcare and WellStar Health System, two leaders in the metro- 
Atlanta healthcare market, formed Piedmont WellStar Health Plans.228  In
the mid-1990s, Piedmont and WellStar participated in a joint venture, Promina 
Health System.229  In California, in 2013, the Sacramento-based Sutter Health 
network of physicians and hospitals launched its own HMO insurance coverage, 
Sutter Health Plus, by applying for a Knox-Keene license.230  Also in California
in 2013, Memorial Care Health System started an insurance division, Seaside
Health Plan.231 
supra note 142, at 71.  Unless it is CVS deciding to acquire Aetna, there will be no challenge
to such transaction.
 225. SWISHER, supra note 212, at 1. 
226. Terry Lynam, While Preserving Its Population Health Commitment, Northwell 




227. Most recent news broke out in August 2017, when Northwell announced they were
closing CareConnect and exiting insurance market gradually—at that point around 120,000
were enrolled in the plans.  Claude Solnik, Northwell to Close CareConnect, LIBN.COM (Aug. 
24, 2017), http://libn.com/2017/08/24/northwell-to-close-careconnect [https://perma.cc/ 
25QX-DCVF].
228. Andy Miller, Piedmont, WellStar Cutting Back on Health Plan, GA. HEALTH NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.georgiahealthnews.com/2015/09/piedmont-wellstar-cutting-
health-plan [https://perma.cc/N573-GEL2] (noting the plan was launched in 2013 and scaled
back after two years of operations). 
229. Id.
 230. See Sutter Health Unveils Name of New Health Plan, SUTTER HEALTH (June 6,
2013), https://news.sutterhealth.org/2013/06/06/sutter-health-unveils-name-of-new-health-plan/
[https://perma.cc/2T3S-9SLZ].  A Knox-Keene license is required to operate a health care 
service plan under the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975. Knox-Keene
Overview, GARNER HEALTH L. CORP., http://garnerhealth.com/knox/ [https://perma.cc/ 
LSG2-RKMC]; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1349 (West 2017). 
231. Seaside Health Plan, MEMORIALCARE, https://www.memorialcare.org/guides-
tools/seaside-health-plan [https://perma.cc/4XCE-LKJY].
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The aftermath of the new entries proves it may be easier to enter insurance 
markets with a regulated insurance product, such as Medicare Advantage.232 
Larger systems do have an advantage: the insurance products are utilizing 
their existing systems in a complex deal.233  Examples of health systems 
going this route are Geisinger Health System with its Geisinger Health Plans,234 
or John Hopkins Medicine with the John Hopkins HealthCare.235 
Launching their own insurance product can allow hospitals to follow the
Kaiser path—consolidate care, reduce their own insurance costs, improve
margins, and accordingly put their competitors, both pure insurers and pure
healthcare providers, in a competitive disadvantage.236  Although not engaging
in price-fixing practices, potential elimination of competitors, who simply 
are not able to survive in the world of declining margins, can allow dual
providers to increase prices in the long run.
Vertical arrangements are overall “less likely to raise antitrust concerns.”237 
Only fifty-eight vertical mergers were challenged between 1994 and 2018, 
and only four of them were related to the healthcare or pharmaceutical
field.238 
Ultimately, a provider–payer duality enables a hospital, or health system 
for that purpose, to form a narrow network239 and tier away competitors
without direct one-on-one negotiations with a third party.240  Competitors
 232. See MILLER & WOLFE, supra note 145, at 7. 
233. Id.
 234. See Health Insurance Plans that Meet Your Needs, GEISINGER CARING HEALTH
PLAN, https://www.geisinger.org/health-plan [https://perma.cc/5C67-5LWC].
235. See Johns Hopkins HealthCare LLC, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.
hopkinsmedicine.org/johns_hopkins_healthcare/index.html [https://perma.cc/5A2Q-SYFQ].
236. See MAIURO, supra note 107, at 17–18. 
237. MILLER & WOLFE, supra note 145, at 3.
 238. See generally  STEVEN C. SALOP & DANIEL P. GULLEY, VERTICAL MERGER 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 1994–JULY 2018 (2018), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/ 
facpub/1529/. 
239. A narrow network is the insurance product that limits the patients’ choice of
providers within the health plan’s network.  Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare 
Sys., No. 1:13-cv-01054-SLD-JEH, 2016 WL 5817176, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016)
(describing narrow network as incentivizing insurers to send the beneficiaries to in-network
providers and as desirable to providers due to the increased patient volume). It is an important
negotiating point between an insurer and a healthcare provider and significantly impacts
prices the consumer pays for healthcare services. Dicesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. 
Auth., No. 16 CVS 16404, 2017 WL 1359599, at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Apr. 11, 2017) (referring to 
narrow networks as “popular steering tools”). A narrow network significantly limits the
patient’s access to out-of-network providers and is analyzed in antitrust law from the exclusivity
perspective. Id.; Methodist Health, 2016 WL 5817176, at *2. 
240. Mark Botti, Partner, Squire Paton Boggs LLP, Roundtable: Antitrust Perspectives
on Evolving Provider and Payment Models (Feb. 25, 2015), in WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT:
EXAMINING HEALTHCARE COMPETITION 132 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_events/618591/transcript-day2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SUN6-JZVD].
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do not have the power to negotiate—they will be by default in a tier subordinate 
to the provider–payer system.  Kaiser does not compete with others for providing
healthcare services.  Instead, others compete with Kaiser for member lives, 
for customers who choose Kaiser to be their insurance provider and, 
correspondingly, the care provider.  The “attribution of population”241 impact 
to the market is hardly explored. 
Meanwhile, the ability to form its own health plan allows a health system 
to “level the playing field against dominant insurers.”242  Certainly, there are
concerns of potential negative reaction from the major insurance companies
if a health system opens up its own insurance arm,243 but the recent wave
of vertical integration hints that this concern is without merit.  Longevity
of the enterprise is another issue, but this Comment treats it as secondary 
to the possibility of a relatively easy market entry that is not subject to the
traditional antitrust scrutiny of vertical mergers.  Moreover, based on the
discussed examples, such market entry is possible primarily, if not exclusively,
for larger, integrated health systems.
3. ACO: Ambiguity Around the “Vertical Integration” Revisited
ACOs present an interesting phenomenon of three-fold integration:
physicians, hospitals, and insurers.244  Although hospital participation is
not a required element of an ACO, it certainly enhances the organization’s
efficiency in providing a care continuum and engaging in population health
management.  The insurer also participates indirectly through risk sharing 
with the healthcare provider—stopping just “short of [a] merger”245 if it is at
all possible to be in such a close relationship with Medicare, a governmental 
payer, that is central to the ACO development. 
241. Id. at 133. 
242. CANTOR & KOURY, supra note 83, at 2. 
243. A possible fear is that the existing contracts will be endangered.  However, when
the health system is well established in the region that concern is probably less. 
244. ACOs are designed to strengthen vertical integration between the healthcare players.
See MILLER & WOLFE, supra note 145, at 6.  Run by CMMI, they are to bring together efforts 
of the insurer and the provider.  Id.
245.  Martinez et al., supra note 117. 
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a. Formation of the ACO: Review and Lack Thereof
ACO formation is not subject to a regulatory challenge as long as the ACO 
meets the CMS eligibility criteria.246  At this point, ACO formation is solely
federally regulated.  Although a few states have passed ACO certification 
programs,247 the majority of states do not have any guidelines.  Medicare’s
general eligibility requirements for MSSP ACO participation are relatively
easy to meet for established—and especially integrated—systems.248 
Antitrust review pre-formation is not efficient, as it only applies to
independent entities that are entering into an ACO as a form of collaboration 
—independent physicians, for example.  Integrated delivery systems are 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny as a part of the approval process.249  This relaxed 
approach may serve as a tempting incentive to form an ACO to coordinate 
care, share information, and control spending while increasing the market
power and strengthening the competitive position. 
246. The FTC and DOJ have provided guidance on ACO formation and as long as it 
is followed, the ACO can expect “rule of reason” be applied to its operations.  Antitrust
Laws Exist to Protect Consumers, Not Providers, MOD.HEALTHCARE (Apr. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 
Antitrust Laws Protect Consumers], http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140419/ 
MAGAZINE/304199951 [https://perma.cc/65VS-TG6H] (citing Markus Meier, Assistant
Director for Healthcare Enforcement, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission). 
Therefore, formal procedures are primary in decisions on whether federal regulators will 
examine an ACO for anti-competitive methods of operations.  See id.
247. These states are Texas, Massachusetts, and New York.  Matt Goodman, Dallas-
Based ACO is First in North Texas to Earn Rare Certification, D CEO HEALTHCARE (Mar.
12, 2015), http://healthcare.dmagazine.com/2015/03/12/dallas-based-aco-is-first-in-north-texas-
to-earn-rare-certification [https://perma.cc/A2X2-TL3E]; Rajiv Leventhal, Massachusetts 
ACO Certification Program Now Includes 17 Members, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Jan.
5, 2018), https://www.healthcare-informatics.com/news-item/value-based-care/massachusetts-
aco-certification-program-now-includes-17-members [https://perma.cc/XE22-LB74]; Neal
N. Peterson, Proposed Regulations in New York for ACO Certification Reflect Medicare 
Shared Savings Program Influence, DORSEY (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.dorsey.com/ 
newsresources/publications/2014/11/proposed-regulations-in-new-york-for-aco-certifi__.
248. An ACO must be a legal entity formed under the applicable state law and authorized 
to conduct business in the respective state, which would allow the ACO to receive shared 
savings payments.  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS 
PROGRAM, MEDICARE ACO TRACK 1 + MODEL, AND SNF 3-DAY RULE WAIVER: 2018
APPLICATION REFERENCE MANUAL 41 (2017).  In addition, an ACO must have a governing 
body, at least 75% of which is held by the ACO participants—physicians or hospitals.  Id. 
at 45.  Finally, an ACO must have a minimum of 5,000 of aligned beneficiaries—this number
is determined by services previously provided to the beneficiaries by the participating
providers. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
SUMMARY OF THE JUNE 2015 FINA RULE PROVISIONS FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
(ACOS) UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 4 (2016). 
249. ACO Statement, supra note 108, at 67027. 
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The FTC and DOJ provided in the ACO Statement that mere participation 
in one of the Medicare programs avoids integration questions.250  The FTC
stated that if an ACO participates in the Shared Savings Program and
follows identical processes in the Medicare and commercial markets, it is 
safe to operate with commercial payers as well.251  Consequently, for an ACO 
participating in CMS programs, expansion to the commercial market is 
basically guaranteed.252 
Moreover, exclusively private ACOs are not regulated on the same level 
as Medicare ACOs.253  The guidance by the FTC and DOJ is primarily directed
at Medicare ACOs although there is express language including commercial 
ACOs’ in the pool: “The Policy Statement is intended to ensure that health
care providers have the antitrust clarity and guidance needed to form 
procompetitive ACOs that participate in both the Medicare and commercial
markets. . . .”254 and “[t]he analytical principles underlying the Policy Statement 
also would apply to various ACO initiatives undertaken by the Innovation 
Center within CMS as long as those ACOs are substantially clinically or 
financially integrated.”255 
However, the ACO Statement was issued in 2011, at the relatively early
stages of commercial ACO development and is not reflective of the character 
of the ACO establishment today.  There is no distinctive standard for a 
commercial ACO structure or a specific guidance on how to form a 
procompetitive commercial ACO. Therefore, in addition to the ACO Statement, 
traditional joint venture analysis should be applicable to commercial ACOs.256 
The safety zone exception would be granted if the financial integration is 
250. Id. at 67026–29.  Participation in the MSSP is the “proxy for integration.”  David 
W. Simon & H. Holden Brooks, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in Healthcare, ACC (Jan. 
3, 2012) http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/faeihc.cfm [https://perma.cc/ 
KSQ5-KSM7].
251. Antitrust Laws Protect Consumers, supra note 246. 
252.  Contracts with private payers are subject to rule of reason analysis as opposed to
being treated as per se violation.  Simon & Brooks, supra note 250. 
253. Jaime King & Erin Fuse Brown, New Health Care Symposium: States’ Critical 
Role Overseeing Vertical Health Care Integration, HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 3, 2016), http:// 
healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/03/03/new-health-care-symposium-states-critical-role-overseeing- 
vertical-health-care-integration (“[T]here is no regime of oversight for commercial ACOs.”). 
254. ACO Statement, supra note 108. 
255. Id. at 27026 n.7 (emphasis added). 
256. Traditional joint venture analysis evaluates the market and the competition and 
not necessarily the ACO structure and affiliations.
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sufficient to justify joint sales—if the market share is no more than 20%257 
and if no multi-provider network is involved.258  The  ACO Statement, 
unlike the 1996 Statements,259 defines “market” and “service,” but the definitions
are loose and concentrated strictly on the geographical location of business.260 
Commercial ACOs’ operations and practices are allegedly significantly
different from those of Medicare ACOs.  They are subject to fewer federal
regulations and requirements, and they have the negotiable terms with the 
ultimate payer.261  Commercial ACOs may also have different payment 
mechanisms, such as capitation or FFS with only one feature in common
with the Medicare sibling—generating savings while preserving quality
of care.262  One reason to create Medicare ACOs is to share savings or losses
with Medicare, or the government, based on the population that is assigned
to the payer by the existing policy.263  In the commercial ACO world, where
managed beneficiaries join supposedly willfully, the savings are coming,
not from and for the government payer—and ultimately taxpayers—but for
pure business organizations bearing the risk, be it healthcare providers or 
insurers. 
Another antitrust aspect arises when an ACO—most often commercial, 
but sometimes Medicare as well—is a fully-owned subsidiary of a larger
health system.264  There is no standard set by the FTC and DOJ on how that
257. Twenty percent is for exclusive networks; for non-exclusive networks, it is 30%.
ROBERT BELFORT & MARTIN THOMPSON, AVOIDING REGULATORY LAND MINES IN COMMERCIAL 
ACOS 5 (2014).  However, the main focus is clinically integrated networks—in highly
fragmented market, 20% market share is extremely high.  As an example, the San Diego market
is divided in the following manner: Sharp HealthCare has market share of 27%, Scripps 
Health has 25%, everyone else is well below 20%. Ha Tu, Joy Grossman & Peter Cunningham, 
San Diego: Health Care Providers Expand Capacity as Competition Increases for Well-
Insured Patients, CAL. HEALTH CARE ALMANAC, Jan. 2013, at 1, 3–4. 
258. THE STATEMENTS, supra note 86, at 114–15. 
259. Compare ACO Statement, supra note 108, with THE STATEMENTS, supra note 
86, at 114–15. 
260. The “safety zone” exception for Medicare ACOs is available if each of the
participant’s market share in the primary service area does not exceed 30%—or 20% for 
exclusive networks.  ACO Statement, supra note 108, at 67028. 
261. “An ACO is in the eye of the beholder and the federal version is much different
from the commercial.”  Larkin, supra note 195 (quoting Robert Cimasi).  Robert Cimasi, 
a healthcare consultant, believes diversity of ACOs in the current market reflects the
flexibility of regulations, especially in the private market. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Medicare is “government insurance” available to a certain segment of the 
population.  Daniel Marans, Insurance Companies Just Accidentally Made the Case for Medicare 
for All, HUFFPOST (Mar. 9, 2017, 3:51 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/insurance- 
companies-medicare-for-all_us_58c1b1fae4b054a0ea690dc8 [https://perma.cc/43Z7-GTA7]. 
264. A list of notable ACOs is published annually, and the following stand out due
to the coverage and well-established organization behind them, such as the following:
Advocate Healthcare—Illinois, over 1,800 participating providers, agreements with Blue 
Cross Blue Shield and UnitedHealthcare, participation in MSSP program; Allina Health—
660
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should impact the initial antitrust analysis clearing up the new ACO to
proceed. It matters because in the case of a large organization being a sole 
owner, it would all but ensure the absence of antitrust concerns.265 
b. ACO Market Share Analysis 
A grey area is whether a commercial ACO’s market share affects the
prices paid by private insurers and therefore constitutes illegal price fixing.266 
However, antitrust concerns are “subject to [the] ‘rule of reason’ test,” which 
is passed if the ACO is financially and clinically integrated, with the integration
benefits outweighing anticompetitive impacts.267  Given the high costs of
becoming an ACO and functioning as one, a great share of ACO providers 
are an already established system, especially when a hospital is involved.268 
What are the chances the FTC or DOJ would challenge the ACO formation 
in this case?  Private antitrust lawsuits are also unlikely due to costs and 
burden to the plaintiff.269 
The FTC and DOJ ACO Statement establishes an antitrust safety zone 
for ACOs that satisfy CMS’ final rule and meet market share and exclusivity 
requirements.270  Interestingly enough, all ACOs, regardless of composition—
physicians exclusively or physicians and hospitals—are treated the same
by the ACO Statement, whereas the FTC and DOJ Statements clearly state
Minnesota, “one of the . . . original Pioneer ACOs,” covers over 300,000 beneficiaries; Banner 
Health Network—Arizona, Pioneer ACO, agreements with Aetna, Cigna, and UnitedHealthcare;
Cleveland Clinic—Ohio, MSSP, over 2,800 participating providers, agreement with Cigna; and
Fairview Health System—Minnesota, Pioneer ACO, Fairview and North Memorial Vantage
with Medica. 100 Accountable Care Organizations to Know 2015, BECKER’S HOSP. R.
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/lists/100-accountable-care-organizations-
to-know-2015.html [https://perma.cc/WL5B-HAXR].
265. A single entity legally cannot enter into an agreement with itself and restrain
competition. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 194 (2010) (“[A] parent corporation 
and its wholly owned subsidiary ‘are incapable of conspiring with each other for the
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act’ . . . .” (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp.,
467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984))). 
266. See Belfort, supra note 176. 
267. Id.  A bigger health system, such as Geisinger and Sharp, typically would not have
an issue to demonstrate clinical and financial integration.
268. “According to the 2013 AHA survey, ACO hospitals are three times more likely
to be urban and more than twice as likely to be teaching institutions and system-affiliated
than non-ACO hospitals.”  Larkin, supra note 195. 
269. The “plaintiff must show the loss of . . . business will have an impact on competition
and consumers.” Greaney & Ross, supra note 99, at 223. This is a fact-intensive inquiry; 
establishing competitive harm is difficult. See id. at 224. 
270. See ACO Statement, supra note 108, at 67028. 
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that organized provider networks are subject to a greater antitrust scrutiny.271 
This presents a discrepancy between the two guidelines and suggests a 
possibility that already integrated providers may want to utilize ACO as a 
shelter to avoid additional scrutiny by the antitrust watchdogs.  In the discussions 
of the ACO formation, there was a significant push to provide for relaxed
antitrust standards for physician-owned ACOs as a means to establish adequate
competition for hospital-dominated markets and therefore for the federal
agencies to “broaden the standards for integration . . . in evaluating proposed
ACOs.”272  Apparently, this goal has been achieved, but the relatively relaxed 
standards were established for all ACOs as the result. 
CMS indicates that ACOs shall exercise rule of reason and voluntarily
request antitrust clearance from the FTC or DOJ.273  However, this clearance
is not a requirement.274 Besides, the process of obtaining an advisory opinion 
from the federal agency is “lengthy and costly.”275  Although the FTC and 
DOJ state that they either have examined or will examine any ACO with 
physician members representing more than 30% of the market share in a
specialty, it is unlikely to occur in the fragmented healthcare market.276 
There is a correlation between the HMO market share and the ACO
enrollment, indirectly suggesting that ACOs and HMOs are competitors,
and the ACO model may be an alternative product to a traditional HMO 
system.277  Health plans, especially employer-owned ones, may be recognizing 
the negative reputation of HMO insurance products and are attempting to
offer an alternative, especially considering the frustrations in the HMO
system over referrals and cost-saving techniques.278  For hospital systems, 
ACOs may become one of the ways to rebrand and become “a convener of
health resources” as opposed to being a mere “provider of hospital beds.”279
 271. THE STATEMENTS, supra note 86, at 3–4. 
272. BALTO, supra note 185, at 17. 
273. ACO Statement, supra note 108, 67842. 
274. In her speech from 2014, Deborah Feinstein, FTC commissioner, stated that “[o]nly
two ACOs . . . requested antitrust review” by the FTC.  FEINSTEIN, supra note 96, at 6.
 275. Belfort, supra note 177; see also BALTO, supra note 185, at 9 (“The cost of securing
a business review letter from the FTC . . . is now well more than $100,000 . . . .”).
276. David Dranove, ACOs and Antitrust: A Few Words of Caution, HEALTH CARE
BLOG (June 26, 2012), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2012/06/26/acos-and-antitrust-
a-few-words-of%C2%A0cautio/ [https://perma.cc/JSS3-2XSS]. 
277. See STEPHEN M. SHORTELL ET AL., ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN
CALIFORNIA: PROMISE & PERFORMANCE 15 (2015), http://berkeleyhealthcareforum.berkeley.
edu/wp-content/uploads/BerkeleyForumACOExpBrief3_feb16.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UU6-
FB2A].
278. See LANDERS-NELSON ET AL, supra note 166, at 4 (“Health plans and employers
received a great deal of blowback in the 1990s from employees over frustrations with health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), especially about referral procedures and the perception
that plans and providers were denying necessary care to save money.”). 
279. Larkin, supra note 195. 
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Specifically, in an employer ACO, employers have multiple means of 
financially incentivizing employees to participate in an employer-sponsored
ACO and therefore increase cost controls over the continuum of care.280 
The size of the employer may significantly impact the market power of the 
ACO that contracted with such an employer.  The financial incentives from 
employers are unquestionably legal, but they raise antitrust concerns; for 
example, a conduct for ACOs to avoid is “[p]reventing or discouraging private 
payers from incentivizing patients to choose certain providers,” whether 
inside or outside the ACO.281 If the employer serves as an ACO or directly
contracts with an ACO and administered the health plan for the employees, 
this conduct should at least seem questionable. The similarity to the HMO 
plan is obvious in this case: the healthcare provider, the ACO, is accountable 
for elimination of unnecessary cost and bears the financial risk.  The attribution 
of a patient to the ACO provider in a commercial—and especially employer
—environment seems to be less intuitive and willful than in a Medicare 
environment.282 
An ACO achieves efficiency when it reaches the right size to be able to 
effectively control the aligned population and reduce costs, but this efficiency
is only up to the point when it starts “stifling competition.”283 
4. Traditional Vertical Merger Analysis Does Not 
Capture New Trends 
Vertical transactions in healthcare have become more complex in the
past decade due to three main trends: (1) increase in traditional vertical
mergers, (2) vertical consolidations and de novo entries to market segments 
that previously were traditionally separate, and (3) emerging concept 
of population health and risk sharing represented by ACOs.  The Vertical
280. Some financial incentives include: Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) or
Health Saving Account (HAS) deposits for choosing to participate in an ACO; smaller deductibles
for seeking services within the ACO network; and reduced co-pays or deductibles for services
received from the ACO providers.  LANDERS-NELSON ET AL, supra note 166, at 6.
 281. ACO Statement, supra note 108, at 67030. 
282. Voluntary selection of care provider at all times and no need in referrals are the 
key features that are supposed to distinguish an ACO from an HMO. See Blackstone & Fuhr, 
supra note 156, at 13; see also supra text accompanying note 200. 
283. Morton, supra note 5.
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Merger Guidelines, last revised in 1984, cannot possibly reflect these 
trends.284 
The FTC and DOJ warn that each set of guidelines cannot possibly embrace 
all merger scenarios.285  Still, tools or methodologies used by the regulators, 
should be comprehensive and contemplative of the current trends.  Evidently, 
the integration level comes to light when assessing potential antitrust violations 
in addition to analyzing the impact on the competitors.286  The level of vertical
integration, specifically, is hard to assess.  Given the historical trend of viewing
vertical structures as “procompetitive,”287 existing antitrust regulations fail to
address their impacts on the healthcare landscape and the opportunities 
resulting from the lack of regulations.
IV. PROPOSED UPDATE TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF PROVIDER-
OWNED PLANS AND ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTIONING
 
AS PROVIDERS AND PAYERS
 
In one of the recent Next Generation ACO webinars, CMMI personnel 
referred to ACO as a “virtual health plan.”288  This approach perfectly reflects
the view authorities have over the phenomenon that is rapidly growing and 
expanding into spheres other than Medicare.289  Simultaneously, this approach 
outlines the problem in regulating it: the current regulatory framework is 
simply not prepared for the consolidated treatment of insurer and payer,
which exists not only in the ACO model, but also in the provider-owned
health plans.290  This Comment will not provide a comprehensive solution 
to all regulation issues arising out of the dual provider–payer structure. 
However, it proposes the solution to the antitrust challenges that arise out
of the loopholes created by the structural changes in healthcare over the 
last decade. This proposed solution includes updates to the regulations 
284. Nowhere in the Vertical Merger Guidelines there is a reference to the phenomena
specific to post-ACA enactment healthcare.  See generally NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 90. 
285. “[M]erger analysis does not consistof uniform application of a single methodology. . . . 
[T]hese Guidelines . . . are illustrative and do not exhaust the applications of the relevant
principle.”  HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 1.
286. Assessing the level of integration is not an easy task as it is fact specific and 
may incorporate such factors as capitation arrangements, centralization of services, and
central monitoring and review functions implemented in the healthcare organization.  See 
Cohen, supra note 186. 
287. MILLER & WOLFE, supra note 145, at 4.
288. Webinar: Next Generation ACO Model: Lesson Learned and Planning for
Participation (CMMI 2017). 
289. See supra text accompanying note 177. 
290. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
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over vertical integration that will specifically address the provider–payer 
collaboration through the methods described in the following section. 
A. Update to Vertical Integration Guidelines 
Providers may undertake payer roles for different reasons: they may
genuinely believe that such models will become mandatory at a point, they
may want to gain exposure to the risk sharing environment, or they have 
a greater interest in care coordination and better alignment.291  Regardless 
of what those reasons are, the underlying goal is vertical integration.
Vertical integration and the unique provider–payer nature of healthcare 
organizations in the recent trend raise antitrust issues that have not been
previously brought up.  There is no per se violation of the current law. 
Meanwhile, the guidelines to healthcare mergers, which are a joint effort by 
the FTC and DOJ, have remained unchanged since 1996.292  Overall, the
application of antitrust principles in healthcare is a complex endeavor due 
to the rule of reason balancing test, but the “market imperfections and the 
rapid pace of change” complicate it even more because relying on the case
law and prior advisory opinions issued by the agencies is problematic in
the wave of change.293  Formal regulations need to be introduced specifically
for the healthcare field294 and independent from potential changes to the
ACA.
 291. See Alison Fleury, Senior Vice President, Sharp HealthCare, Early Observations
Regarding Accountable Care Organizations, in WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT: EXAMINING HEALTHCARE
COMPETITION, supra note 240, at 22. 
292. The Vertical Merger Guidelines have not been revised since 1984.  See supra text
accompanying note 284.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have not been revised since 
2010. See supra note 92. 
293. Greaney & Ross, supra note 99, at 202 (“[A]pplying antitrust principles in healthcare 
is always a tricky undertaking, as market imperfections and the rapid pace of change make 
predictions predicated on the past unreliable.” (citing Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s 
Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857 (2004)). The 
changes following the ACA enactment have been even more rapid than anything prior and 
there is virtually no precedent to base a decision on. The potential repeal of the ACA does 
not impact the difficulty of the decision.  If the repeal takes place it will not revert the
healthcare to the pre-ACA era.
294. Again, currently healthcare does not enjoy a separate treatment; it qualifies as 
one of the “learned professions” under Goldfarb and falls under standard antitrust analysis. 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).  However, the existence of
healthcare-specific Guidelines indicates that at least partial separation and unique antitrust 
nature of healthcare is admitted by the Agencies. See generally THE STATEMENTS, supra
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Referring to healthcare regulations, today mostly everyone expresses
concern regarding the ACA repeal by the current Administration.  This 
Comment asserts that the potential impacts of the repeal cannot stop the 
market developments.  Once consolidation has started, it is extremely hard 
to stop.  The ten years under the ACA have changed the way health systems 
operate.  Therefore, no matter what the fate of the ACA is, updated antitrust
regulations should be adopted or current antitrust guidelines should be adjusted 
to allow the government to properly analyze the new structures. 
B. Areas for Regulatory Revision 
The updated regulations should reflect a few important areas that are 
discussed below.  In healthcare, the whole purpose of antitrust laws is to 
ensure a competitive marketplace and quality of care; reduction in competition 
is not permitted “simply because it may appear to lead to lower prices.”295 
The dual nature of provider-insurer needs to be recognized along with the
issues that arise out of it.  If new regulations are not introduced, there is a 
risk of repeating the managed care scenario from twenty years ago—from 
its appearance and the original enthusiasm of the market, to the high expectations
surrounding it, up to its dawn in many parts of the country.296  This Comment
analyzes the traditional loopholes; eliminating them will significantly improve
efficiency of antitrust regulations in the current environment.  Particularly, 
the following require an update in the regulations:297 case-by case transactions; 
the definition of product as applied to healthcare; the definition of healthcare
market; approaches to data sharing; control over narrow networks, reporting
requirements; and, last but not least, authority over enforcement.
Case-by-Case Transactions. Federal regulators are currently examining 
transactions on case-by-case basis.  As stated in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, “merger analysis . . . . is a fact-specific process through which the
Agencies, guided by their extensive experience, apply a range of analytical 
tools to the reasonably available and reliable evidence.”298  However, with 
the influx in volume of vertical integrations, it is unrealistic to expect that
the agencies would have “the resources or the capacity”299 to review
note 86. Regulators do realize that the challenges here are quite different from other sectors; 
however, further development is needed. 
295. Health Industry Hearing, supra note 223. 
296. Managed care concept is still utilized—for example, HMO products—but not all 
organizations are willing to engage in it; those who do, however, are much better situated
to the continuum of care framework. 
297.  Proposed mechanisms are discussed in the corresponding sub-sections. 
298. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 1. 
299. King & Brown, supra note 253. 
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all transactions taking place in the United States.300  Antitrust analysis in 
each rule of reason case starts with definition of the product market.  In the 
provider-payer organization case, this presents two issues: (1) what is the 
product, and (2) what is the market. 
Product Definition. Regulators are used to treating products as divided by
services provided.301  This approach requires a revision.  Product in 
integrated organizations is essentially the continuum of care, from providing 
health insurance coverage to providing treatment services.  The main competitors 
would be pure insurers, pure healthcare providers, and all existing dual 
provider–payer organizations. 
Market Definition. Both ACO and provider-owned plan arrangements 
trigger market power concerns, which is overall one of the key antitrust
issues.302 However, the definition of market utilized by the antitrust enforcers
and based mostly on the geographic location is outdated,303 and revisions to
the concept of market are crucial to appropriately apply antitrust regulations. 
Back in 1990, Judge Posner said, “People want to be hospitalized near their 
families and homes, in hospitals in which their own—local—doctors have
hospital privileges.”304  However, healthcare has changed since the 1990s, 
and geographical market share is no longer expressed through zip codes.305 
300. As Feinstein puts it, “[f]or every transaction that [the FTC] challenge[s], there are
many more that [the FTC] determine[s] do not warrant a challenge.  In most cases, [the FTC]
do[es] not make public [their] decisions not to take action against a particular arrangement 
because of confidentiality concerns.”  FEINSTEIN, supra note 96, at 9.  This assertion is vague, 
not unlike antitrust laws, and does not provide reassurance that all—or at least most—
transactions that are potentially violating antitrust principles receive necessary review.
301. See Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Primary and secondary . . . hospital services are common medical services like setting a 
broken bone and performing a tonsillectomy [whereas] ‘tertiary care’ . . .  includes more complex
services like invasive cardiovascular surgery and intensive neonatal care.”).
302. “Antitrust enforcement helps ensure potentially more efficient ways of delivering
and financing health care can develop and compete, while preventing accumulations of market
power that harm competition.”  ROBERT S. CANTERMAN, ANTITRUST AND COLLABORATION
IN HEALTH CARE 10 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
healthlaw/15_canterman.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A74-YVB4]. 
303. Court decisions “stretch[] the geographical boundaries”—although there is a view
this is done to prevent antitrust litigation.  Hammer & Sage, supra note 17, at 90 (citing 
United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 972 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated, 
107 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1997)) (defining a geographic market around Poplar Bluff, Missouri
to “include[] hospitals 70–100 miles away”). 
304.  United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990). 
305. There has not been major litigation to apply revised approaches to market that would
reflect the new products and boundaries these products are functioning in. See Hammer
& Sage, supra note 17, at 90. 
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Accordingly, the character of the merger is no longer merely geographical 
as the service lines are blending.  Therefore, the key metrics of assessing merger
anticompetitive effects—Herfindahl-Hirschman Index306—needs an equivalent 
native to healthcare.307  The focus on care continuum begs the question,
what could be a better basis for market share calculation?  Is it geographic 
market, or covered beneficiaries, or provided services, or maybe even realized
benefit? There is a blend between insurer and healthcare provider, and 
this new blended category should be recognized and receive its own appropriate 
treatment and measurement as antitrust assessment of market power is
concerned. 
Data Sharing and Unfair Competitive Advantage. Sharing insurer and
care provider information leads to more efficient care and cost reductions.308 
Data exclusivity in the modern age may have anticompetitive impacts,
especially healthcare charges and competitor cost data.  Some states have 
started to address data sharing controversy by creating a centralized all-
payer claims database (APCD).309  APCD “is an electronic system that
aggregates claims and [corresponding] administrative data from [government]
and private payers.”310  It is a state-driven effort, and the rules for what 
information may be collected and how it shall be collected vary based on 
the state.311  Standardization is necessary.  Availability of and access to a federal 
claims database would decrease the incentive for vertical integration for 
the sole purpose of gaining access to data.  It would also provide for equal
access to data for all players in the market, regardless of their size.  Therefore,
participation in such database should be mandated for organizations wishing 
to participate in a provider–payer relationship.
306. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a standard market concentration measure
that is determined by (1) calculating every relevant firm’s market share, (2) squaring each
market share, and (3) calculating the sum of the squares.  MILES, supra note 70, at 22. The 
higher the value, the higher the market concentration and, correspondingly, the closer the 
firm is to a monopoly. See id.
307. The FTC weighs the HHI—specifically changes in the HHI as it relates to a 
merger—heavily in antitrust analysis. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 
89, at 18–19. 
308. Data availability provides healthcare providers opportunities for improvement. 
See Botti, supra note 240. Research also shows merged firms lower their costs by 5–14% on 
average. See Teresa D. Harrison, Do Mergers Really Reduce Costs? Evidence from Hospitals, 
49 ECON. INQUIRY 1054, 1055 (2011). 
309. Currently, nineteen states have passed legislation that enables the collection of 
healthcare claims data. APCD Legislation by State, APCD COUNCIL, https://www.apcdcouncil.org/
apcd-legislation-state [https://perma.cc/SV9U-RKNK].
310. Evan Sznol, Issue Brief: All Payers Claims Databases, SOURCE BLOG (June 19,
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Narrow Networks and Increased Negotiating Power. By nature, the
provider–payer organization structure represents a narrow network that is
artificially limited.312  As long as it does not harm the consumer, the agencies
usually do not have antitrust concerns that arise out of mere narrow
network formation. However, some believe “narrow networks can be a
tool for payers to cause competition”;313 correspondingly, provider-payers
can use narrow networks to reduce competition both from other payers and 
from other providers, thus impacting two traditional markets at the same 
time.  In a provider–payer arrangement, insurance companies are no longer 
the main customer responsible for payment and negotiating rates.  Instead, 
the patient is the customer choosing the insurance service.  There needs to
be an adjustment of narrow network definition specifically acknowledging a
provider–payer structure and a stricter examination of such.  Negotiating 
power is important; however, the basis of the negotiating power becomes 
unclear in the absence of the insurance as a third party, a middleman, and
the risk-bearer.  Price to the consumer exclusively may be a plausible option, 
but price in the healthcare market is not always an adequate measure for 
antitrust analysis nor is it the primary factor patients base their provider 
choice on.314  Increased bargaining power of the payer-provider in the absence
of a middleman, or a traditional health insurance plan, provides a competitive
advantage. 
Pre-Formation Reportability. Pre-formation reportability should become a
requirement regardless of the estimated value of transaction.  Safety zones
are an easy way to avoid scrutiny.315  Obviously, reviewing each and every 
transaction is not feasible; however, reportability is better based exclusively 
on the size of the competitors and, possibly, on the market share transaction 
participants hold as opposed to the mere size of the transaction.  Factoring 
in HHI will also provide for more consistent review.  Alternatively, reportability
requirements must embrace a greater variety of collaborations, as opposed 
to including only traditional mergers, and must also extend to de novo
transactions316 for established market participants over a certain size. 
312. See supra note 239. 
313. Tara Koslov, Deputy Director, FTC, Office of Policy Planning, Roundtable: Antitrust
Perspectives on Evolving Provider and Payment Models, in  WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT:
EXAMINING HEALTHCARE COMPETITION, supra note 240, at 129–30. 
314. Health Industry Hearing, supra note 223. 
315. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
316.  For discussion of qualifying de novo transactions see supra text accompanying 
note 224. 
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State Versus Federal Enforcement. A number of authors support the 
view that states should take the leading role in ensuring fair competition in
the healthcare market.317  In favor of that proposition comes an often-mentioned 
limited resource capacity by the FTC and DOJ.318  However, state regulations 
are not uniform.  A few states have already protected healthcare providers 
from federal antitrust liability.319  Some states are in the process of carving 
out further exemptions.320  However, healthcare historically has been an area
of heavy government intervention.321  The pending repeal of “insurance 
immunity” under the McCarran–Fergusson Act322 indicates that federal 
legislators do not have full confidence in state-driven antitrust actions.323 
Time of change is not a proper moment to shift gears in the regulating and
monitoring forces and delegate traditionally federal enforcement area to
the states. Besides, more and more organizations collaborate across state
lines—for example, Medicare ACOs, which often entail the development 
of the commercial product under the same umbrella—and that would complicate 
inquiries made by the states. 
There are multiple opportunities to address the regulatory loopholes.
This Comment does not provide a detailed recommendation on how to do 
so, but rather highlights the areas that require attention and revisions. 
317. See, e.g., King & Brown, supra note 253 (suggesting the states should “complement 
and supplement” federal efforts). 
318. Although this author was unable to find any data on the exact resources allocated to 
healthcare antitrust by the FTC and DOJ, it is highly unlikely that the increased number 
of transactions in the industry led to the staff reallocation or additional hiring. 
The major issue confronting the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission will not be whether litigation challenges 
to health care consolidation should be launched: rather, it will be identifying how 
their limited resources should be deployed to challenge only those transactions 
that most deeply offend the Clayton and Sherman Acts.  If the expected increase
in merger activity is greater than the antitrust agencies can handle, a number of 
mergers that may have been otherwise challenged may escape antitrust prosecution. 
CANTOR & KOURY, supra note 83. 
319. See Sage et al., supra note 17, at 34 (“In recent years more than twenty states
have enacted laws to protect hospitals, providers, and other health-related entities from 
antitrust liability.”).
320. Ramirez, supra note 102, at 2246 (“In some states, legislation has been proposed
that would exempt health care providers that engage in collaborative activity, including
joint ventures and mergers, from antitrust review.”).
321. Martin Gaynor, believes states lack incentives for healthcare organizations to 
communicate and coordinate and that state regulations may ultimately harm competition.
Martin Gaynor, Professor of Economics and Health Policy, Carnegie Mellon University,
Roundtable: Antitrust Perspectives on Evolving Provider and Payment Models, in WORKSHOP 
TRANSCRIPT: EXAMINING HEALTHCARE COMPETITION, supra note 240, at 126. 
322. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
323. See supra note 66. 
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V. CONCLUSION
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez asserted healthcare will remain “a top 
agency priority.”324  This is an appealing idea because currently the FTC 
and DOJ’s joint efforts are inadequate to ensure the competitive equality 
of healthcare providers. Competition in healthcare moved from the traditional 
pricing and volume approach to the balance of quality and mere presence 
in the marketplace.  Antitrust principles, and specifically their enforcement,
have a measurable impact on the American public’s health through market
monitoring, timely bans on certain transactions, and effective support of
other procompetitive efforts.  The FTC and DOJ will determine the direction 
of healthcare by having a say on whether Amazon launches a wholesale
pharmacy and whether CVS acquires Aetna, creating a futuristic one-stop
shop healthcare marketplace for its customers.325 
Ensuring agencies retain their focus on the appropriate efforts and use
the appropriate analytical tools is key to preserving competition in healthcare. 
Current antitrust regulations are outdated and fail to provide valuable guidance 
to new market entrants and new market developments in assessing the 
competition impacts.326  The new formations may be—and in most cases
are—perfectly legitimate in their main goal of reducing costs while achieving 
high quality results.  However, without a valid framework for preserving 
the legitimacy there is a potential loophole for the healthcare organizations to
utilize.  Healthcare competition desperately needs updated federal regulations
to address antitrust concerns related to the dual nature of provider-payer, 
continuum of care, and population health management.  Healthcare is an
industry like any other, but it is simultaneously driven by unique developments; 
therefore, the “just-another-industry” approach to antitrust issues in healthcare 
is outdated.
324. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Retrospectives at the FTC: 
Promoting an Antitrust Agenda, Remarks at the George Washington University Law School 
Symposium: ABA Retrospective Analysis of Agency Determinations in Merger Transactions 11
(June 28, 2013).
325.  It is not yet clear which agency will take the lead on the deal review. CVS is a 
pharmacy and subject to FTC review, whereas Aetna, as an insurance company, is subject
to review by the DOJ.
326. Fiona Scott Morton believes “that while the essential laws dictating antitrust haven’t
changed in 100 years, new technology, globalization, and changes like those in healthcare 
delivery have greatly expanded the realm of what can fall under antitrust.”  Morton, supra
note 5.
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Antitrust laws are static and not easily changed;327 therefore, the first 
step to recognize its uniqueness is for the regulatory agencies to provide
an adequate framework specifically for healthcare to acknowledge the 
concerns discussed in this Comment, and to provide the uniform approach 
for agencies to follow in reviewing healthcare transactions in the future.
The agencies’ policies are not binding on the courts; however, judicial reaction
will follow as courts find the agencies’ guidance persuasive.328  Courts are 
not always experienced in the economic analysis of antitrust principles,329 
and the regulating agencies must take the lead in offering a comprehensive
“translation” of the antitrust principles, especially in the context of healthcare 
that balances traditional economic well-being with the consumer’s social
welfare. 
The future is uncertain.  The ACA may or may not be repealed. Tech
giants, such as Apple, Amazon, and Google, may enter the pharmacy market. 
The CVS–Aetna merger may or may not come through.  These transactions, 
however, indicate the transformation mechanism in healthcare has been 
launched and cannot be stopped, regardless of what transpires with these 
deals in the future or the ACA in general.  Healthcare in the United States 
is a business like any other; preserving its social nature and recognizing 
the unique antitrust challenges is paramount to the Nation’s health. 
327. Cohen, supra note 186. 
328. See supra note 85. 
329. Judge Bork’s work, The Antitrust Paradox, is referred to as a persuasive translation
of antitrust law’s economic effects for “members of a Court neither trained in nor sympathetic
to economic analysis.” George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of The Antitrust Paradox,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 457 (2008).  The persuasive translator roll shall be held
by the FTC and DOJ.  See id. 
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